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The Role of the "Harm/Benefit" and
"Average Reciprocity of Advantage"
Rules in a Comprehensive Takings
Analysis
Lynda J. Oswald 50 Vand. L. Rev. 1449 (1997)
In this Article Professor Oswald contends that judicial and scholarly
analysis in recent years has focused on the per se and ad hoc tests for regula-
tory takings. Little attention has been given to two tools that the Supreme
Court historically used in distinguishing a noncompensable regulation from a
compensable taking: the harm/benefit test and the average reciprocity of
advantage rule. In simple terms, the harm/benefit test states that a
regulation intended to prevent a public harm is a valid exercise of the police
power, while a regulation intended to confer a public benefit is potentially a
regulatory taking. The average reciprocity of advantage rule maintains that
there is a subset of benefit-conferring regulations that do not rise to the level of
a compensatory taking: those that provide reciprocal benefits to the regulated
parties.
In this Article, Professor Oswald explores the historical evolution and
development of these two rules, and their roles as building blocks of a compre-
hensive takings theory. Professor Oswald concludes that while the two rules,
as originally articulated, provided valuable paradigms for distinguishing be-
tween valid and invalid exercises of the police power, the rules have since been
corrupted to the point where they have become unusable. Revival of the his-
torical articulations of these two rules would enable courts to draw a clearer
distinction between regulatory takings and valid police power actions, and
would thus provide a critical first step toward resolving the current takings
"dilemma."
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I. INTRODUCTION
A "regulatory taking" occurs when the government does not
formally exercise its power of eminent domain, but enacts a law or
undertakes an action that results in a de facto "taking" of property for
which compensation is constitutionally mandated., The United States
Supreme Court has struggled for decades to determine when a land
use regulation is a valid exercise of the police power (and thus not
subject to the compensation requirement of the Fifth Amendment to
the United States Constitution) and when such a regulation goes "too
far" and becomes a regulatory taking.
2
The Supreme Court has developed a number of tools to assist
courts and legislatures in determining when a regulation crosses the
critical line to become a compensable taking.3 The Court has carved
out two categories of per se takings: those involving permanent
physical occupation by the government 4 and those involving depriva-
tion of "all economically productive or beneficial uses of land," pro-
vided the regulated use is not a nuisance-like activity prohibited or
constrained at common law.5 Per se takings cases are relatively rare,
however, and the Court has relied primarily upon ad hoc determina-
1. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides "nor shall private property be
taken for public use without just compensation." U.S. Const. Amend. V. The United States
Supreme Court has determined that this protection is made applicable to the states through the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, Burlington and Quincy
Railroad Co. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897).
2. The Supreme Court held in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922),
that "[t]he general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."
3. The Supreme Court has defined regulatory takings law in terms of a continuum-at
one end are valid exercises of the eminent domain power, and at the other are valid exercises of
the police power. Regulatory takings occur at some undefined spot in between, where a
regulation crosses an invisible line and becomes, in effect, an exercise of eminent domain rather
than a police power act. See id. at 413 ("When [regulation] reaches a certain magnitude, in most
if not in -all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the
act."). I have criticized the continuum notion, arguing that it "obscures a very potent fact: An
invalid exercise of the police power is not necessarily an exercise of the eminent domain power
requiring compensation; rather, it may be an invalid regulation." The continuum notion results
in muddled analysis and, ultimately, incorrect outcomes. Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark-
Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 Wash. L.
Rev. 91, 139 (1995). See notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
4. See, for example, Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 434-35
(1982) (holding that a permanent physical occupation of property is a taking "without regard to
whether the action achieves an important public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on
the owner"); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946) (holding that a physical invasion
of airspace is a taking even though "the owner does not in any physical manner occupy that
stratum of airspace or make use of it in the conventional sense").
5. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029-30 (1992).
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tions,6 guided by notions of "justice and fairness."7 To aid in this com-
plicated task of ad hoc decision making, the Court has created two
"tests" or sets of factors to be considered. When considering "as ap-
plied" challenges to regulations, courts are to be guided by the three-
factor test articulated in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City,8 which examines "[t]he economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant..., the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
distinct investment-backed expectations, [and] the character of the
governmental action."9 Facial challenges, on the other hand, are to be
decided under the two-factor analysis laid out in Agins v. Tiburon,i°
which maintains that a regulation results in a taking if the regulation
fails to advance substantially a legitimate state interest or if it denies
a property owner economically viable use of the property."
TAKING TESTS
PER SE TESTS AD HOC TESTS
1. Permanent physical occupations (Loretto) 1. As Applied: (Penn Central)
a. economic impact on property
2. Deprivation of all eqonomically viable owner
use (Lucas)
b. interference with investment-
backed expectations and
c. character of government action
2. Facial (Agins):
a. fails to substantially advance
legitimate state interest or
b. denies property owner
economically viable use
Figure 1
6. See Ruckeishaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005 (1984) (stating that
determination of "whether a taking has occurred is essentially an 'ad hoc, factual' inquiry")
(citation omitted); Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)
(noting that the Supreme Court has been unable to formulate a definitive test for when a
regulatory taking has occurred).
7. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
8. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
9. Id. at 124 (citation omitted).
10. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
11. Id. at 260. Although the Court has indicated that this facial/as-applied distinction in
tests exists, it has failed to honor the distinction in several cases. See generally Oswald, 70
Wash. L. Rev. at 98 (cited in note 3) (citing cases).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
Historically, the Supreme Court has used two additional tools
in distinguishing a noncompensable regulation from a compensable
taking: the harm/benefit test and the average reciprocity of advantage
rule. Simply put, the harm/benefit test states that a regulation in-
tended to prevent a public harm is a valid exercise of the police power
(for which no compensation is required), while a regulation intended
to confer a public benefit is potentially a regulatory taking (for which
compensation is constitutionally mandated). The average reciprocity
of advantage rule maintains that there is a subset of benefit-confer-
ring regulations that do not rise to the level of a compensable taking:
those that provide reciprocal benefits to the regulated parties. These
two once-powerful rules have become less effective in recent years.
Courts and commentators have decried the harm/benefit test as being
little more than a linguistic sham, while the Supreme Court has read
the average reciprocity of advantage rule so broadly that almost any
regulation could be validated under its tenets.
In a recent article12 in which I discussed (and dismissed) the
role of the economic factors laid out in Penn Central and Agins, I
suggested that both the harm/benefit test and the average reciprocity
of advantage rule have an important, if limited, role to play in the
proper resolution of regulatory takings claims. In this Article, I ex-
plore the evolution and development of these two rules as well as their
roles as building blocks of a comprehensive takings theory. I conclude
that while the two rules as originally articulated were valuable tools
for distinguishing between valid and invalid exercises of the police
power, the rules have since been corrupted to the point that they are
no longer helpful. A return to the original intent of these two rules
would enable courts to draw a clearer distinction between regulatory
takings and valid police power actions, and would thus provide a
critical first step toward resolving the current takings dilemma.
Part II of this Article discusses the distinction between the
police power and the eminent domain power and reiterates the two-
step takings analysis set forth in my earlier work. I maintain that
takings analysis should focus first upon the nature of the government
power being exercised-eminent domain or police power-and second,
once that power has been identified, upon the validity of the govern-
ment's exercise of that power.
The remainder of this Article fleshes out the first step in this
analysis-identification of the government power. Parts III and IV
address the role of the harm/benefit and average reciprocity of advan-
12. See generally Oswald, 70 Wash. L. Rev. at 91 (cited in note 3).
[Vol. 50:14491452
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tage rules in making this critical distinction. Part III examines the
doctrinal development of the harm/benefit test and evaluates the
efficacy of the test in light of the criticisms typically raised against it.
Part IV examines the historical development and modern application
of the average reciprocity of advantage rule, and evaluates the
Supreme Court's application of this principle. Part V concludes with a
discussion of the relationship between the police power and the
harm/benefit and average reciprocity of advantage rules, urging a
revival of police power analysis that fully incorporates both of these
principles.
II. DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN THE EMINENT DOMAIN AND POLICE
POWERS: THE BIFURCATED TAKINGS ANALYSIS
All takings cases ultimately require a court to distinguish
between an exercise of the eminent domain power, which requires
payment of just compensation, and an exercise of the police power,
which does not. Although the Fifth Amendment provides a succinct
definition of the eminent domain power-a taking of private property
for public use13-no such concise definition of the police power exists.14
The police power is considered an inherent attribute of sovereignty, a
necessary tool by which the state can promote the public welfare. 5
13. See note 1 and accompanying text (quoting Fifth Amendment).
14. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (noting that "police power" lacks a
specific definition). As the Supreme Court cautioned, the police power "is not confined... to the
suppression of what is offensive, disorderly or unsanitary. It extends to so dealing with the
conditions which exist in the State as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of its people."
Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 318 (1907).
15. Professor Freund provided the classic definition of the distinction between the eminent
domain and police powers:
Under the police power, rights of property are impaired not because they become useful
or necessary to the public, or because some public advantage can be gained by disregard-
ing them, but because their free exercise is believed to be detrimental to public interests;
it may be said that the state takes property by eminent domain because it is useful to the
public, and under the police power because it is harmful or as Justice Bradley put it, be-
cause "the property itself is the cause of the public detriment."
Ernst Freund, The Police Power: Public Policy and Constitutional Rights § 511 at 546-47 (1904)
(footnote omitted). See also Allison Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning
(Making Room for Robert Moses, William Zeckendorf, and a City Planner in the Same
Community), 58 Colum. L. Rev. 650, 665 (1958):
From time immemorial the common law and statute law have evidenced a community
judgment that it is proper to make an activity assume the burdens or costs which that
activity might cause .... But to compel a particular owner to undertake an activity to
benefit the public, even in the form of a restriction, is to compel one person to assume the
cost of a benefit conferred on others without hope for recoupment of the cost ....
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The United States Supreme Court provided its "classic" statement'6 of
the police power in 1894:
To justify the state in... interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it
must appear, first, that the interests of the public... require such
interference; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
17
The Court has noted, however, that the police power "is, and must be
from its very nature, incapable of any very exact definition or limita-
tion."18 The Court has interpreted the power broadly, 19 and has stead-
fastly refrained from setting forth any specific test for the validity of a
police power act.
20
Nonetheless, courts have long recognized the important dis-
tinction between the police power and the eminent domain power.21 In
an 1851 case, for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated:
16. Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
17. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). As Professor Freund stated:
[The state] exercises its compulsory power for the prevention and anticipation of wrong
by narrowing common law rights through conventional restraints and positive regula-
tions which are not confined to the prohibition of wrongful acts. It is this latter kind of
state control which constitutes the essence of the police power. The maxim of this power
is that every individual must submit to such restraints in the exercise of his liberty or of
his rights of property as may be required to remove or reduce the danger of the abuse of
these rights on the part of those who are [unskillful], careless or unscrupulous.
Freund, The Police Power § 8 at 6 (cited in note 15) (emphasis omitted).
18. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wallace) 36, 62 (1872).
19. See, for example, Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594 ("'[Police power' connotes the time-tested
conceptual limit of public encroachment upon private interests. Except for the substitution of the
familiar standard of 'reasonableness,' this Court has generally refrained from announcing any
specific criteria.").
20. See, for example, Cusack Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 531 (1917) (stating that
the Court would overturn a state police power act "only when it is plain and palpable" that the
government action has no "real or substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or to
the general welfare"); Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railway Co. v. .llinois ex rel. Drainage
Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 592 (1906) ("IThe police power of a State embraces regulations designed
to promote the public convenience or the general prosperity, as well as... the public health, the
public morals or the public safety."); Mayor, Alderman and Commonalty of the City of New York
v. Miln, 36 (11 Peters) U.S. 102, 139 (1837) (noting that it is "emphatically" difficult to define
"with the proper precision and accuracy... a subject so diversified and multifarious as the
[police power]").
21. See, for example, California Reduction Co. v. Sanitation Reduction Workers, 199 U.S.
306, 324-25 (1905) ("[The clause prohibiting the taking of private property without compensation
is not intended as a limitation of those police powers which are necessary to the tranquillity of
any well-ordered community, nor of that general power over private property which is necessary
for the orderly exercise of all governments. It has always been held that the legislature may
make police regulations, although they may interfere with the full enjoyment of private property,
and though no compensation is made.") (citations omitted).
TAKINGS ANAL YSIS
We think it is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well ordered civil
society, that every holder of property, however absolute and qualified may be
his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it may be so
regulated, that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having
an equal right of enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the
community.... This is very different from the right of eminent domain, the
right of a government to take and appropriate private property to public use,
whenever the public exigency requires it; which can be done only on condition
of providing a reasonable compensation therefor.... Nor does the prohibition
of such noxious use of property [i.e., injurious to the public] although it may
diminish the profits of the owner, make it an appropriation to public use, so as
to entitle the owner to compensation.
22
Takings law is currently viewed as existing along a contin-
uum. 23 One end of the continuum is anchored by the traditional form
of eminent domain: a physical confiscation of property, no matter how
trivial. The other end is anchored by a valid police power action.
Traditional takings analysis maintains that a police power regulation
that crosses some invisible line such that it has substantially the same
effect as a physical confiscation ceases to be a valid police power ac-
tion, and becomes instead a "regulatory" taking. That notion of a
continuum is incomplete and inaccurate, for it ignores the possibility
that an invalid police power action is not necessarily an exercise of the
eminent domain power; rather, it may simply be an invalid regula-
tion.2
4
Courts should abandon the flawed continuum model in favor of
a two-step process. First, the nature of the government power being
exercised-police power or eminent domain-must be identified.
Second, the validity of the government's exercise of that power must
be evaluated, for not all exercises of the police power or eminent
domain are legitimate.
This Article focuses on the first step of this bifurcated takings
analysis and the tools that the Supreme Court has developed to ad-
dress the distinction between police power and eminent domain ac-
tions.25 Early on, the Court articulated the harm/benefit test,26 which
22. Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cushing) 53, 84-86 (1851). See also
Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 22 Mass. (11 Met.) 55, 57 (1846); Brick Presbyterian Church v. City
of New York, 5 Cow. 538 (N.Y. 1826); Lakeview v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co., 70 Ill. 191, 197-99
(1873).
23. Oswald, 70 Wash. L. Rev. at 136-38 (cited in note 3).
24. Id. at 139.
25. Because of space limitations, I save analysis of the second step for a later paper.
26. Professor Kmiec has argued that the original meaning of the Takings Clause supports
the harm/benefit distinction. See Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking
1997] 1455
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maintains that government actions that are intended to extract bene-
fits by appropriating private property for public use are exercises of
the eminent domain power, while government actions intended to
prevent harm to the community's health, safety, welfare, or morals are
exercises of the police power.
This traditional sectoring of the eminent domain and police
powers in terms of benefit-conferment and harm-prevention works
well as a general proposition. However, a more exacting statement of
the distinction between the two powers recognizes that while all
eminent domain actions confer benefits, some exercises of the police
power do so as well, such as zoning ordinances and other similar
measures that result in reciprocal benefits to the burdened property
owners. The Supreme Court has upheld such actions on the ground
that they afford an "average reciprocity of advantage" to property
owners affected by the regulation.27 The key distinction is that emi-
nent domain must, by definition, result in benefit to the public, while
police power actions validated under the average reciprocity of advan-
tage rule (i.e., those conferring benefits) may result in benefits solely
to the regulated property owners or jointly to the property owners and
the public-but never to the public alone. Rather, police power actions
that benefit solely the public must be validated, if at all, under the
harm/benefit test.
EMINENT DOMAIN vs. POLICE POWER
(compensation required) (no compensation required)
confers public benefit prevents public confers private
harm (e.g., nuisance) or private/public
benefit (ARA)
AVERAGE RECIPROCITY OF ADVANTAGE'I
reciprocal benefits and burdens
benefit and burden specific benefit and burden to large
to individual property owner group of similarly situated
(e.g., special assessments) property owners (e.g., common
schemes, zoning)
Figure 2
Clause is Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1630, 1635 (1988) (tracing historical roots
of the Takings Clause).
27. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. See Part IV (discussing average reciprocity of advantage
theory).
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Unfortunately, over the past few decades, legal doctrine has
ignored the distinction between the police power and the eminent
domain power, causing the two to converge.2 Moreover, the Supreme
Court obliterated any remaining distinction between the two powers
when it held that "[t]he 'public use' requirement [of the Takings
Clause] is thus 'coterminous' with the scope of a sovereign's police
powers,"29 effectively rendering the public use requirement a dead
letter. Having merged these two powers and thus having destroyed
the most fundamental distinction between regulations that require
compensation and those that do not, the Court has been left ever since
with the monumental (and so far insurmountable) task of articulating
a comprehensive takings theory.30 The Supreme Court has been re-
duced to emphasizing the "ad hoc, factual" nature of takings analy-
sis,31 to asserting that there is "no set formula to determine where
regulation ends and taking begins,"3 2 and to stating that the determi-
nation relies "as much [on] the exercise of judgment as [on] the appli-
cation of logic. ''33 Revival of the eminent domain/police power distinc-
tion in conjunction with careful application of the harm/benefit and
average reciprocity of advantage rules is necessary to resolve many of
the thorny issues surrounding modern takings analysis, and is an
essential first step in the articulation of a clear, comprehensive
takings theory.
28. See John J. Costonis, Presumptive and Per Se Takings: A Decisional Model for the
Taking Issue, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 465, 478-82 (1983) (describing the convergence of police and
eminent domain powers); John J. Costonis, 'Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power:
Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1021, 1033-37
(1975) (same).
29. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984); see also Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26, 32 (1952) ("Subject to specific constitutional limitations, when the legislature has
spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms well-nigh conclusive."). See generally
Lynda J. Oswald, Goodwill and Going-Concern Value: Emerging Factors in the Just
Compensation Equation, 32 B.C. L. Rev. 283, 295 (1991); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 Yale L. J.
1077, 1078-79 (1993); Comment, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain; An Advance
Requiem, 58 Yale L. J. 599 (1949).
30. See notes 3-11 and accompanying text (discussing Court's takings theories).
31. See notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
32. MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348-49 (1986) (citation
omitted).
33. Id. at 349 (citation omitted).
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III. THE HARM/BENEFIT TEST
Simply put, the harm/benefit test states that a regulation that
prevents a property owner from inflicting harm upon the legal rights
of others is a valid exercise of the police power and thus not a taking
subject to the compensation requirement of the Fifth Amendment. A
regulation intended to confer a benefit upon the public, on the other
hand, can give rise to a compensable regulatory taking. The
harm/benefit test was originally espoused in an 1887 United States
Supreme Court case, Mugler v. Kansas.4 After a sporadic and check-
ered career, the test was explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in
its 1992 decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,3 5 and
then implicitly revived by its 1994 decision in Dolan v. Tigard.
36
Commentators have long noted that there is a "beguiling sim-
plicity and a perpetual appeal," 7 an "intuitive fairness"38 to the
harm/benefit test. It seems axiomatic that the state should be able to
constrain a property owner whose actions inflict harm upon the legal
rights of others without having to compensate the property owner;
likewise, a government action that extracts value from a property
owner in an effort to transfer such value to the public at large is pre-
cisely the type of taking of private property for public use for which
the Constitution mandates compensation.3 9
Despite the acknowledged theoretical attractiveness of the
harm/benefit test, it has been heavily criticized by the United States
Supreme Court4° and commentators41 in recent years. Perhaps it is
time t6 ask whether a test that has consistently survived repeated
attempts to kill it does not have some underlying legitimacy that
contributes to its continued existence.
34. 123 U.S. 623, 648-81 (1887).
35. 505 U.S. 1003, 1022-26 (1992). Lucas is discussed in notes 119-34 and accompanying
text.
36. 512 U.S. 374 (1994). Dolan is discussed in note 135 and accompanying text (in the
context of the harm/benefit test) and in notes 391-94 and accompanying text (in the context of the
average reciprocity of advantage rule).
37. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 Yale L. J. 36, 48 (1964).
38. Kmiec, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 1635 (cited in note 26).
39. See generally Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1236-37 (1967).
40. See, for example, Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022-26 (discussed in notes 119-34 and
accompanying text).
41. See, for example, Michelman, 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 1199-1201 (cited in note 39);
Rubenfeld, 102 Yale L. J. at 1099-1100 (cited in note 29); Sax, 74 Yale L. J. at 48-50 (cited in note
37). Not all modern commentators have rejected the test. See, for example, Kmiec, 88 Colum. L.
Rev. at 1633-38 (cited in note 26) (attributing the "continued life" of the distinction between
harm and benefit to the test's "intuitive fairness").
[Vol. 50:14491458
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A. The Harm/Benefit Test in the Supreme Court
Because the evolution of the harm/benefit test has been com-
prehensively addressed by several commentators, 42 no attempt is
made here to provide a complete accounting of its development. An
examination of the jurisprudential context in which the harm/benefit
test grew would reveal expanding notions of the scope of the police
power and the extent of government regulatory power.43 All that is
relevant for our purposes here, however, are the broad brush strokes
with which the Supreme Court has painted the legal landscape of the
harm/benefit test.
1. Historical Development of the Test: Mugler, Mahon, and Euclid
Although the harm/benefit test is generally regarded as having
its genesis in Mugler v. Kansas,44 regulation of nuisance-like or
noxious uses of private property dates back to colonial times. 45 Indeed,
heavy overtones of nuisance law permeate the cases discussing and
developing the harm/benefit test. Mugler, however, represents the
Court's first deliberate attempt to articulate the principles underlying
regulation of noxious or nuisance-like uses.
In Mugler, the defendant property owners had brewed beer at
their respective premises for several years.46 The state constitution
was amended to prevent the manufacture and sale of alcohol except
42. See generally Catherine R. Conners, Back to the Future: The "Nuisance Exception" to
the Just Compensation Clause, 19 Cap. U. L. Rev. 139 (1990); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
Responsibility, Causation, and the Harm-Benefit Line in Takings Jurisprudence, 6 Fordham
Envir. L. J. 433 (1995); Thomas A. Hippler, Comment, Reexamining 100 Years of Supreme Court
Regulatory Takings Doctrine: The Principles of "Woxious Use," "Average Reciprocity of
Advantage," and 'Bundle of Rights" from Mugler to Keystone Bituminous Coal, 14 B.C. Envir.
Aff. L. J. 653 (1987).
43. Among those were the notions that certain industries were so important or so large
that they were "clothed with the public interest and thus subject to greater regulatory control.
See Lunney, 6 Fordham Envir. L. J. at 455-59 (cited in note 42). Additional legal factors included
ratemaking issues regarding monopolies or near-monopolies, such as utilities and railroads. Id.
at 445-49.
44. 123 U.S. at 623.
45. In a recent and provocative study, Professor Hart demonstrated that colonial land use
legislation did not regulate merely harmful uses, but also regulated for purposes unrelated to
preventing nuisance. John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern
Takings Doctrine, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1252, 1259-81 (1996). It would appear to me that at least
some of the benefit-conferring regulations discussed in his work could be explained in terms of
average reciprocity of advantage. See Part IV (discussing the average reciprocity of advantage
rule).
46. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 656-57.
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for medicinal, scientific, and mechanical purposes, 47 and the state
legislature passed supporting legislation.48 The defendants continued
their brewing activities in defiance of the statute, arguing that the
legislation diminished the value of their breweries without just com-
pensation, thus depriving them of property without due process of law
in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.49
Justice Harlan, writing for the majority, began by acknowledg-
ing that the breweries involved were "of little value" for purposes
other than the manufacture of beer, and that enforcement of the pro-
hibitory statute would "very materially diminish[ ]" the value of the
properties. 50 The Mugler Court then provided a two-pronged analysis
of the constitutional question. First, the Court established that police
power regulations are "not-and consistently with the existence and
safety of organized society, cannot be-burdened with the condition
that the State must compensate" property owners for the losses in-
flicted upon them by such regulations.51
Second, the Court drew a distinction between exercises of the
police power and exercises of the eminent domain power based upon
the nature of the government action at stake-i.e., abatement of a
nuisance versus physical invasion. -52 The Court explicitly grounded
this part of its analysis "upon the fundamental principle that every
one shall so use his own as not to wrong and injure another."53
The Court relied upon Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park,54 an 1878
case in which it had acknowledged that a city ordinance effectively
prohibited a fertilizer company from operating within the city, thus
destroying its business and severely diminishing its property values.
However, because the business had become a nuisance to the commu-
nity in which it was conducted, producing discomfort and often sick-
47. Id. at 655.
48. Id. at 655-56.
49. Id. at 654, 657, 664.
50. Id. at 657.
51. Id. at 669. The Court stated: "A prohibition simply upon the use of property for
purposes that are declared, by valid legislation, to be injurious to the health, morals, or safety of
the community, cannot, in any just sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for
the public benefit." Id. at 668-69.
52. Id. at 668-69.
53. Id. at 667 (quoting Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. (7 Otto) 659, 667 (1878)). The
"fundamental principle" to which the Court referred was the common law's historical refusal to
recognize as property rights uses that caused injury to the rights of others. The traditional say-
ing is sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedes, or "[u]se your property in such a manner as not to
injure that of another." Black's Law Dictionary 1380 (West, 6th ed. 1990). See also Munn v.
Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1877) (asserting that the state may require "each citizen to so conduct
himself, and so use his own property, as not unnecessarily to injure another").
54. 97 U.S. (7 Otto) 659 (1878).
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ness among huge masses of people, 55 the city was entitled to act, under
its police power, to abate that nuisance in order to further the public
health.56 Finding that the statute at issue in Mugler operated to abate
a similar type of nuisance, the Mugler Court concluded that the
statute was a valid, noncompensable police power regulation.
57
The clear distinction drawn by Justice Harlan in Mugler be-
tween the police power and the eminent domain power was blurred in
1922, when Justice Holmes penned his influential opinion in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.58 Justice Holmes abandoned the
early Court's conception of the eminent domain and police powers as
distinct and separate government acts that necessarily define the
limits of compensation. Instead, he introduced the concept of the
takings continuum that still persists today.59 In striking down the
Kohler Act, a Pennsylvania statute that prohibited coal companies
from mining in such a manner as to cause subsidence of overlying
structures, Justice Holmes uttered his now-famous tenet that "while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking."6 Although Justice Holmes con-
ceded that the question of "too far" was one "of degree" and not suscep-
tible of easy formulation,61 he emphasized the "danger of forgetting
55. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 667.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 669. The Mugler Court distinguished cases involving physical invasion, finding
that such cases necessarily involved exercises of the eminent domain power. The Court
discussed Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871), in which a property owner
sued for damages for the flooding of his land caused by the state's construction of a dam to
improve irrigation. The Mugler Court characterized Pumpelly as "a case in which there was a
'permanent flooding of private property,' a 'physical invasion of the real estate of the private
owner, and a practical ouster of his possession.'" Mugler, 123 U.S. at 668 (citation omitted).
Because the owner's property was, "in effect," converted to public use as a result of the physical
invasion, an exercise of eminent domain had arisen which required compensation. Id. Mugler,
on the other hand, involved the use of the police power to prohibit a use of property that the
legislature had determined to be injurious to the public health, morals, or safety. As the Mugler
Court characterized the distinction, "in the one case, a nuisance only is abated; in the other,
unoffending property is taken away from an innocent owner." Id. at 669. At the time Mugler
was decided, eminent domain actions were viewed in terms of physical invasions. Since then, the
Court has determined that where the economic effect of a regulation upon the property owner
has the practical effect of a physical invasion, the Constitution mandates payment of just
compensation. See, for example, Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1028-29. Thus, the modern impact of Mugler
is far broader than its relatively narrow language would suggest.
58. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
59. See Oswald, 70 Wash. L. Rev. at 136-37 (cited in note 3) (explaining the development of
the continuum notion). See also notes 23-24 and accompanying text (criticizing the continuum
notion).
60. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
61. Id. at 416.
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that a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not
enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the
constitutional way of paying for the change." 2 In Justice Holmes's
view, at some point a police power action will cross over some invisible
line-measured in terms of economic impact upon the owner-and
cease to be a valid police power action, becoming instead a "regulatory
taking" for which compensation is constitutionally mandated. 63
The Mahon Court framed the issue before it in terms of the
police power; specifically, it asked whether the police power could "be
stretched so far" as to "destroy [the coal companies'] previously exist-
ing rights of property and contract."64 The Court went on to conclude
that the dispute before it was essentially a private one and thus did
not justify the intervention of the police power.65 The coal company
had conveyed a deed to surface rights to the plaintiffs, expressly re-
taining the right to remove all coal underlying the property and ex-
pressly placing the risk of all injury from such activities upon the
plaintiffs.6 6 The Court characterized the Kohler Act as an invalid
legislative attempt to alter the positions that private parties had
negotiated through contractual bargaining.67
The Mahon Court specifically emphasized, though, that its
holding did not depend upon notions of nuisance law.68 Rather,
Justice Holmes's opinion revolved around the notion that the degree of
economic harm determines the existence of a regulatory taking.69 By
62. Id.
63. Id. at 413 ("When [diminution in value caused by police power regulation] reaches a
certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and
compensation to sustain the act.").
64. Id.
65. Id. at 413-14.
66. Id. at 412.
67. Id. at 416 ("So far as private persons or communities have seen fit to take the risk of
acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that their risk has become a danger
warrants the giving to them greater rights than they bought").
68. Id. at 413. Although the Mahon majority did not analyze the case under a noxious use
or nuisance theory, Justice Brandeis, in his dissent, did. Id. at 416 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Justice Brandeis argued that the regulation at issue merely prevented a noxious use and
correctly pointed out that property owners have no right to use their property in a manner that
creates a public nuisance. Id. at 417 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The fact that specific individuals
(for example, owners of overlying houses) might garner "special benefits" from the regulation did
not negate the statute's public purpose, nor, in Justice Brandeis's view, was the regulation
rendered invalid merely because it left the property owner without a profitable use. Id. at 417-18
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
69. See Sax, 74 Yale L. J. at 41 (cited in note 37) ("While [Justice Holmes] never flatly
stated that degree of economic harm was the critical factor in his theory, a reading of his opinions
leaves little doubt that this was indeed the theory he devised."). Thus, while Justice Holmes
recognized that exercises of the police power in some instances will have a negative impact on
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introducing economic factors into the takings analysis, Justice Holmes
set takings law on a very different course from that envisioned by the
Mugler Court.70 By shifting the inquiry from the nature of the gov-
ernmental action at issue (i.e., police power or eminent domain) to the
economic impact of the action upon the property owner, the Mahon
Court not only obscured the valuable role that the harm/benefit test
can play in resolving takings disputes, but also overstated the impor-
tance of economic factors to takings analysis, thereby generating much
of the confusion that pervades this field today.
71
Just four years after Mahon, the Supreme Court issued its
ground-breaking opinion in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 72 in
which it upheld the concept of comprehensive zoning ordinances. The
Euclid Court held that zoning ordinances must be based in the police
power,73 and that such actions must be upheld unless they are found to
be "clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation
to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."74 The Court
noted that the validity of an ordinance will vary with "circumstance
and conditions";75 for example, an ordinance valid in a big city may
well be invalid in a rural setting.76 The Court identified the common
law of nuisance as a "helpful" analogy, though not the controlling
factor, in determining the scope of the police power.77 Zoning restric-
tions on particular uses cannot be analyzed in the abstract, but only in
the context of the surrounding "circumstances and the locality," for as
the Court noted, "[a] nuisance may be merely a right thing in the
wrong place-like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard."78
Unfortunately, the eloquence of the oft-quoted pig simile ob-
scures the fact that the nuisance analogy is incomplete in the zoning
private property values, he also emphasized that such impacts must necessarily be limited or the
Contract and Due Process Clauses are meaningless. See Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.
70. Although Justice Holmes did not explain why he felt Mugler was wrongly reasoned or
decided, he characterized in private correspondence "old Harlan's decision in Mugler v. Kansas"
as "pretty fishy." Mark D. Howe, 1 Holmes-Laski Letters: The Correspondence of Justice Holmes
and Harold J. Laski 1916-35, at 346 (Harvard U., 1953).
71. See Oswald, 70 Wash. L. Rev. at 91 (cited in note 3) (discussing dangers of the
economic tests).
72. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Euclid is discussed more fully in notes 312-28 and the accompany-
ing text.
73. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387.
74. Id. at 395.
75. Id. at 387.
76. Id. at 386-87.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 388.
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context. Euclid implicitly suggests that the validity of a zoning ordi-
nance under the police power is to be gauged solely in terms of the
harm/benefit test. Zoning regulation does incorporate notions of
nuisance law, in the sense that it provides a mechanism for controlling
the externalities created by land uses.79 Indeed, zoning regulation is
more efficient than nuisance law in achieving this purpose because it
identifies potential problems in advance and works to prevent them
from occurring.80
Nonetheless, many zoning ordinances do not truly act to pre-
vent a harm, but rather confer widespread benefit upon the public and
the affected property owners by ensuring that development will be
compatible and uses harmonious or by providing other reciprocal
benefits. Such ordinances, despite their lack of focus on harm-
prevention, can nonetheless be valid police power actions under the
average reciprocity of advantage rule-a topic taken up in Part IV
below.
2. Modern Application of the Harm/Benefit Test:
The Nuisance Exception
After these few early cases, the regulatory takings issue lay
dormant for several decades. The harm/benefit distinction did not go
completely unaddressed in this timespan, however. In fact, the
Supreme Court indirectly addressed the relationship between the
harm/benefit test and the average reciprocity of advantage rule on
several occasions, in the context of articulating what has been termed
the "more modern version" of the harm/benefit test-the "creation-of-
the-harm" test.81 This standard arose in grade-separation cases, that
79. See, for example, Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New
Takings Jurisprudence-An Evolutionary Approach, 57 Tenn. L. Rev. 577, 586 (1990) (describing
how externalities from the construction of skyscrapers in New York City precipitated the city's
first zoning ordinances); Richard A. Epstein, An Outline of Takings, 41 U. Miami L. Rev. 3, 11
(1986) ("[Z]oning, for example, can be a method to prevent pollution by certain types of firms.").
80. See Alfred Bettman, Constitutionality of Zoning, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 835, 837 (1924)
(stating that zoning operates to prevent nuisances); Thomas A. Byrne, The Constitutionality of a
General Zoning Ordinance, 11 Marq. L. Rev. 189, 194 (1927) (noting that zoning "partakes of the
character of the injunctional jurisdiction of equity to prevent nuisances, save that the regulations
are statutory in nature and suit need not ordinarily be resorted to in order to work out the rights
of the parties").
81. Sax, 74 Yale L. J. at 48 (cited in note 37) ("[The 'creation of the harm' test [is] based on
the argument that while in general established economic interests cannot be diminished merely
because of a resulting public benefit, that rule does not apply where the individual whose
interest is to be diminished himself created the need for the public regulation by his conduct.").
Sax rejected the creation-of-the-harm test on the grounds that the test simply addressed
[Vol. 50:14491464
TAKINGS ANALYSIS
is, cases in which the legislature determined that a grade separation
was required where a railroad track crossed a highway at street level
and sought to make the railroad pay all or part of the cost of the
improvement. For example, Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Walters,
82
decided by the Court in 1935, dealt with the validity of a state statute
that required a railroad to separate the grade of a railroad track and a
public highway if such separation was deemed necessary by the State
Highway Commission to protect the safety of either highway or rail-
road users. Half of the costs of all such projects were to be borne by
the implicated railroad, and half by the state highway system.
83
The railroad challenged the ability of the state, under its police
power, to arbitrarily assign a set percentage of the costs Qf such im-
provements to the railroad without individual consideration of the
facts presented in each instance. Justice Brandeis, writing for the
majority, agreed with the railroad. He noted that while the police
power confers broad power to regulate upon a state, "when particular
individuals are singled out to bear the cost of advancing the public
convenience, that imposition must bear some reasonable relation to
the evils to be eradicated or the advantages to be secured." In short,
police power regulations must prevent a harm (i.e., under the
harm/benefit test) or confer a private benefit (i.e., under the average
reciprocity of advantage test).
The Court revisited this analysis in 1953 in Atchison, T. & S.F.
R. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n. 5 The railroads there attempted to
argue that the costs of improvement could be assessed only on the
basis of the benefits conveyed by the project to the railroads.86 The
Court rejected this contention, noting that it embraced only half of the
two-part test set forth by Justice Brandeis in Nashville and improp-
erly ignored the "evils-to-be-eradicated" portion of the test. The
Atchison Court noted:
The railroad tracks are in the streets not as a matter of right but by permission
from the State or its subdivisions. The presence of these tracks in the streets
creates the burden of constructing grade separations in the interest of public
safety and convenience. Having brought about the problem, the railroads are
situations involving the "unfortunate juxtaposition" of lawful but incompatible uses. Id. at 49.
See generally Part MI.B.1 (discussing conflicts between "valid but competing uses").
82. 294 U.S. 405 (1935).
83. Id. at 412.
84. Id. at 429.
85. 346 U.S. 346 (1953).
86. Id. at 352.
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in no position to complain because their share in the cost of alleviating it is not
based solely on the special benefits accruing to them from the improvements.
8 7
Although commentators concede the appeal of the creation-of-
the-harm test,8 they also note that it does not cover every situation in
which the state exercises the police power, nor will it resolve every
regulatory takings challenge.89 Recognizing the same limitations,
courts continued to -formulate different variations of the harmlbenefit
test in their quest for a definitive test to apply. The next major
innovation came in 1978, when Justice Rehnquist articulated the
"nuisance exception" in his dissent in Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. New York City90 The exception was adopted by a majority of the
Court in 1987 in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v.
DeBenedictis91 and was significantly narrowed by Justice Scalia's
majority opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council in 1992.92
Although Justice Rehnquist by no means invented the legal theory
underlying the nuisance exception, 3 he is largely responsible for the
vocabulary that the modern Court uses to discuss takings issues.
Penn Central involved a challenge to a New York City ordi-
nance banning alteration of certain designated historic landmarks. 94
The petitioner alleged a regulatory taking when it was prohibited from
leasing to a third party the right to construct an office tower over its
own property, the historic Penn Central Terminal. A majority of the
Court rejected the claim, finding that the property retained sufficient
economic value and reasonable return to counter any takings allega-
tion.95
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent, disagreed, finding
that the diminution in value of the property was sufficiently great to
constitute a taking and that the challenged regulation could not be
supported by what he called the "nuisance exception."9 He noted that
87. Id. at 353.
88. See Allison Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of
Supreme Court Expropriation Law, 1962 S. Ct. Rev. 63, 75 (noting that the test "has some
element of objectivity"); Sax, 74 Yale L. J. at 48 (cited in note 37) (noting that the test "has
considerable popularity").
89. See, for example, Dunham, 1962 S. Ct. Rev. at 75-76 (cited in note 88); Sax, 74 Yale L.
J. at 49-50 (cited in note 37).
90. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 104, 145 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
91. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
92. See notes 119-34 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of Lucas.
93. See Conners, 19 Cap. U. L. Rev. at 148-82 (cited in note 42) (discussing the antecedents
of the "nuisance exception").
94. 438 U.S. at 108.
95. Id. at 136-38.
96. Id. at 141-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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while the government owes no compensation for forbidding an owner
to make noxious use of his property,97 "[t]he nuisance exception to the
taking guarantee is not coterminous with the police power itself."98
Rather, the relevant question is "whether the forbidden use is
dangerous to the safety, health, or welfare of others."99 Here, Justice
Rehnquist contended, the city was not attempting to regulate a
nuisance, but rather was requiring the Terminal owner to confer a
benefit upon the city by forcing the owner to maintain its structure for
aesthetic reasons. The difference, as he viewed it, was that the city
was not "prohibitfing] Penn Central from using its property in a
narrow set of noxious ways," but rather had "placed an affirmative
duty on Penn Central to maintain" its structure for the benefit of the
public.1°
°
The nuisance exception thus was coined in a dissenting opinion
in a case in which the author found it had not even been satisfied.
Despite this precarious foundation, the exception was incorporated
into regulatory takings law by Justice Stevens's majority opinion in
Keystone in 1987. This case is most notable for its striking factual
similarity to Mahon and for the very different outcomes that the Court
reached in the two cases. At issue in Keystone was a state statute, the
Subsidence Act, which, like the Kohler Act in Mahon, was intended to
prevent subsidence of overlying structures caused by coal mining
activities. Essentially, the Subsidence Act required fifty percent of the
coal under designated structures to remain in place to provide sup-
port.101 As in Mahon, much of the coal at issue had long been severed
from surface rights, and at the time of severing, the risk of subsidence
or other injury had been passed to the surface owner.
10 2
The Keystone Court distinguished the case before it from
Mahon on two grounds: (1) the existence of a legitimate public pur-
pose (as opposed to the private interest at stake in Mahon), and (2) the
lack of "undue interference" with the petitioner's "investment-backed
expectations" (as opposed to the complete destruction of the peti-
97. Id. at 144-45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Mugler, Goldblatt, and Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915)). The majority dismissed the dissent's characterizations of these
cases, finding instead that they were explained by a notion of "social" reciprocity of advantage,
not noxious use. Id. at 133-34 n.30. For further discussion, see also notes 340-41 and
accompanying text.
98. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 45 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 146 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
101. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 476-77.
102. Id. at 478.
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tioner's mining interests in Mahon).'03 Although the Court's decision
ultimately rested upon the latter ground, only the former is relevant
to our discussion here.10 4 The Court found that, unlike the Kohler Act,
which the Mahon Court had found was simply an invalid'attempt to
elevate one private interest over another (i.e., the interest of a private
home owner over that of the coal company), 0 5 the Subsidence Act was
intended to protect the general public interest in surface lands from
the adverse effects of mining operations and to protect the public
safety.1°6 Even though the surface owner in Keystone, as in Mahon,
had contracted for the risk of subsidence, the Court stated that the
fact "[tihat private individuals erred in taking a risk cannot estop the
Commonwealth from exercising its police power to abate activity akin
to a public nuisance."17 The Court went on to state that "the public
interest in preventing activities similar to public nuisances is a sub-
stantial one," and that "[t]he Subsidence Act, unlike the Kohler Act,
plainly seeks to further such an interest."108 The Court provided little
other discussion of the extent of the nuisance exception, except to
agree with Justice Rehnquist's statement in Penn Central that the
exception was not "coterminous with the police power itself."'0
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing a dissent in which three other
Justices joined,110 seized upon the majority's discussion of the nuisance
exception, which he himself had crafted in Penn Central, as a
launching point for his own interpretation of the limits of the police
power. He noted that the exception must be interpreted narrowly lest
it, and the police power, swallow up all government regulation, "for
nearly every action the government takes is intended to secure for the
103. Id. at 485.
104. For a discussion of the "investment-backed expectations" test in takings law, see
generally Oswald, 70 Wash. L. Rev. at 99-117 (cited in note 3).
105. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 413-14.
106. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 485-86. The stated purposes of the Subsidence Act were
"conservation of surface land, . . . protection of the safety of the public, [enhancement of] the
value of such lands... preservation of surface water drainage and public water supplies, and
generally [improvement of] the use and enjoyment of such lands." Id. at 485-86 (citing Pa. Stat.
Ann., Tit. 52, § 1406.2 (Purdon Supp. 1986)). The Court noted that while the Kohler Act did not
apply to land where the surface and subsurface rights were held by the same owner, the
Subsidence Act had no such exception, making its public purpose evident. Id. at 486. In
addition, while the purposes of the Kohler Act could have been achieved through a notice
requirement, the broader objectives of the Subsidence Act were not so easily satisfied. Id.
107. Id. at 488.
108. Id. at 492.
109. Id. at 491 n.20 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 145 (Rebnquist, J., dissenting)).
110. Those who joined included Justice Scalia, who would write the majority opinion in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), five years later. See notes 119-34
and accompanying text (discussing Lucas).
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public an extra measure of health, safety, and welfare.""' Justice
Rehnquist therefore argued that past cases employing the nuisance
exception embraced two "narrowing principles." 2  First, prior
regulations falling under the nuisance exception involved "discrete
and narrow purposes,"" 3 not the "economic concerns" raised by the
Subsidence Act." 4 Second, and in Chief Justice Rehnquist's view,
"more significantly," a regulation validated under the nuisance
exception had never been permitted to extinguish a property interest
completely or prohibit all use.1 5 Rather, the nuisance exception
applies only "where the government exercises its unquestioned
authority to prevent a property owner from using his property to
injure others."1 6 Chief Justice Rehnquist found that not only did the
statute at issue extend beyond this limited definition of the
exception, 17 but "more significantly," the statute completely destroyed
all beneficial use of the petitioners' property.""
The seeds of Justice Scalia's majority opinion in 1992 in Lucas
v. South Carolina Coastal Council are evident in Chief Justice
Rehnquist's dissent in Keystone. Lucas involved a challenge to a state
coastal conservation zone statute that had the effect of preventing the
petitioning property owner from constructing any permanent
habitable structures on his beachfront lots. The Court held that a
taking occurs whenever the owner of real property is "called upon to
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common
good""9 provided that the regulated activity is not a nuisance-like
activity prohibited or constrained at common law.
120
Lucas's per se test,' 2' based on destruction of all economically
viable use but modified by a limited nuisance exception, was not with-
111. Penn Central, 480 U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
112. Id.
113. Id. (citing Goldblatt, Hadacheck, Mugler, and Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928)).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
117. Id. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("The central purposes of the Act, though
including public safety, reflect a concern for preservation of buildings, economic development,
and maintenance of property values to sustain the Commonwealth's tax base. We should
hesitate to allow a regulation based on essentially economic concerns to be insulated from the
dictates of the Fifth Amendment by labeling it nuisance regulation.").
118. Id. at 513-14 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
119. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019.
120. Id. at 1029-30.




out precedent. Professor Freund presaged the Lucas holding by al-
most a century, stating in his 1904 treatise that "a prohibition of prof-
itable use is to all intents and purposes a taking of property."122 Like
Justice Scalia, Freund qualified this blunt assertion. Specifically,
Freund stated:
The absolute destruction or abrogation of property rights-including
confiscatory regulation leaving no reasonable profit to the owner-is an
extreme exercise of the police power. Where it is proposed to exercise such an
authority, the constitutional right of private property must be weighed against
the demands of the public welfare, and it is obvious that a public interest
which is strong enough to justify regulation may not be strong enough to justify
destruction or confiscation without compensation.
123
Freund went on to discuss instances in which destruction or total
confiscation may be permitted, however. He cited, among others,
cases in which property was imminently dangerous to the community
and so constituted a nuisance per se, 124 and cases involving useful but
noxious establishments that were inappropriately located. 125
While the Lucas Court also perceived the need for a nuisance
exception to its per se takings test, it contemplated a narrower nui-
sance test than that espoused by earlier courts and commentators.
Justice Scalia talked at length about the nuisance exception in Lucas,
largely in an attempt to discredit the exception as a limiting principle
in takings analysis. First, he distinguished traditional "noxious-use"
cases, such as Mugler, finding that those cases involved lawful uses
which the government had determined were detrimental to public
policy goals.126 Justice Scalia stated:
The 'harmful or noxious uses' principle was the Court's early attempt to
describe in theoretical terms why government may, consistent with the
Takings Clause, affect property values by regulation without incurring an
obligation to compensate-a reality we nowadays acknowledge explicitly with
respect to the full scope of the State's police power. 127
Thus, he concluded, "'[h]armful or noxious use' analysis
was.., simply the progenitor of our more contemporary statements
122. Freund, The Police Power § 515 at 549 (cited in note 15).
123. Id. § 517 at 550.
124. Id. § 520 at 554.
125. Id. § 529 at 561.
126. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1022-23 (citing also Goldblatt, Hadacheck, and Miller).
127. Id. at 1022-23.
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that 'land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it "substantially
advance[s] legitimate state interests" .... . ,s1
Second, Justice Scalia went on to state that the harm/benefit
test could play no role in regulatory takings analysis because of the
difficulty of determining whether a particular regulation confers a
benefit or prevents a harm. 29 He concluded: "A given restraint will be
seen as mitigating 'harm' to the adjacent parcels or securing a benefit'
for them, depending upon the observer's evaluation of the relative
importance of the use that the restraint favors."' 30
Finally, Justice Scalia distinguished the cases in which the
harm/benefit test had been applied on the grounds that none of them
posed the complete elimination of economic value at issue in Lucas.
3'
According to Justice Scalia, if mere recitation of a harm-prevention
purpose were sufficient to support a complete destruction of property
values in every instance, compensation would never be required in any
instance. Thus, he found that complete deprivation of economic use
necessarily results in a compensable taking unless "the logically
antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's estate shows that
the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.""32
A regulation having such an effect must "do no more than duplicate
the result that could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent
landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law
of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to
abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise."
13
Moreover, Justice Scalia fixed nuisance law at a specific point in time,
stating that "[a]ny limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or
decreed (without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in
the restrictions that background principles of the State's law of
property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.""3
Lucas was a narrow case, explicitly limited to those rare situ-
ations in which the regulation resulted in deprivation of all economi-
cally viable use. The Supreme Court's most recent takings case,
128. Id. at 1023-24 (citations omitted).
129. Id. at 1024 ("[Tihe distinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring'
regulation is often in the eye of the beholder.").
130. Id. at 1025 (citing Sax, 74 Yale L. J. at 49 (cited in note 37)).
131. Id. at 1026 n.13 (citing Mugler, Hadacheck, Goldblatt, Reinman v. City of Little Rock,
237 U.S. 171 (1915), and Plymouth Coal v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914)).
132. Id. at 1027.
133. Id. at 1029 (footnote omitted).
134. Id. at 1024.
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Dolan v. Tigard, did not present a total takings issue. There, the
Court implicitly reembraced the tenets of the harm/benefit distinction
that it had sought to reject in the context of Lucas. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that a government body may
impose conditions upon a land use permit, but that those conditions
must bear a "rough proportionality" that is "related both in nature and
extent" to the negative impacts of the proposed land use.13 5 In effect,
restrictions placed upon the property owners' actions are valid pro-
vided they serve to remedy or prevent harm caused by those actions.
The inherent inconsistency between the treatment of the
harm/benefit test in Lucas and in Dolan illustrates the Supreme
Court's ambivalence toward the test over the past seven decades. The
Court's own uncertainties as to the scope of the harm/benefit test have
diminished the effectiveness of the test and have obscured the impor-
tant role it can play in resolving takings disputes.
B. Evaluating the Harm/Benefit Test
Given the Supreme Court's own inconsistency in dealing with
the harm/benefit test, it is not surprising that commentators have
found ample fodder for their own denunciations of the test. Their
criticisms can be grouped into three general categories: (1) the inabil-
ity of the test to address conflicts between "valid but competing" uses;
(2) the inability of the test to define adequately the distinction
between a "harm" and a "benefit" in any given instance; and (3) the
test's improper interjection of nuisance law into takings analysis. As
this Section illustrates, these arguments do not hold up under close
scrutiny. The harm/benefit test will not resolve all takings issues; it is
unrealistic to suppose that any test might. However, the harm/benefit
test does address a substantial subset of takings cases and, properly
configured, is a useful and necessary tool for analyzing takings claims.
1. Conflicts Between "Valid but Competing" Uses
A common complaint raised against the harm/benefit test is
that in many instances it addresses not a problem of harmful or nox-
ious use, but rather one of "inconsistency between perfectly innocent
and independently desirable uses."'1 6 The classic example presented is
the 1928 Supreme Court case of Miller v. Schoene, 37 in which the
135. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
136. Sax, 74 Yale L. J. at 49 (cited in note 37).
137. 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
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owner of red cedar trees was ordered by statute to destroy his trees
because nearby apple trees were threatened by cedar rust. Professor
Sax's argument is typical:
To say that the cedar tree owner caused the harm is no more accurate than to
say that the apple growers caused the harm by locating near cedar groves. If
we are talking about blameworthiness, some moral wrongdoing or conscious
act of dangerous risk-taking which induces us to shift the cost to a [particular]
individual, it simply does not exist in these cases.138
However, nuisance law is not intended to address blameworthy
or morally incorrect behavior. Rather, it is a system for balancing
competing and generally incompatible behaviors to determine which
should proceed. The level of intent required for imposing liability for
nuisance is merely intent to commit the invasion, not intent to harm
another or to engage in some other sort of morally blameworthy
behavior.13 9 Introducing notions of culpability into the equation raises
a red herring that detracts attention from the true purposes of the
harm/benefit test. Miller presented an unusual and rare set of facts
and the outcome of that particular case could be brushed off as simply
an idiosyncratic oddity. 40 The Court's reasoning is far more difficult
to dismiss, however, and far more damaging because of its potential
influence on future cases. The Miller Court explicitly stated: 'We
need not weigh with nicety the question whether the infected cedars
constitute a nuisance according to the common law; or whether they
may be so declared by statute."4' Rather, the Court found that the
state necessarily was required to choose between the competing
interests of the two groups of property owners and that failure to
legislate would itself have been a choice of elevating the interests of
cedar tree owners over apple tree owners.142  Thus, the Court
reasoned, "[w]hen forced to such a choice the state does not exceed its
138. Sax, 74 Yale L. J. at 49-50 (cited in note 37).
139. Although liability for a nuisance is not imposed without fault, the fault required is
"intentional merely in the sense that the defendant has created or continued the condition
causing the interference with full knowledge that the harm to the plaintiffs interests [is]
occurring or [is] substantially certain to follow." W. Page Keeton, et al., Prosser and Keeton on
the Law of Torts § 87 at 624-25 (West, 5th ed. 1984) (footnote omitted).
140. The situation posed in Miller, while rare, was not unique. In colonial New England,
legislation required landowners to destroy all barberry bushes (which had been cultivated for
food and medicinal purposes) to prevent wheat blight on neighboring properties. See Hart, 109
Harv. L. Rev. at 1273 (cited in note 45).
141. Miller, 276 U.S. at 280.
142. Id. at 279.
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constitutional powers by deciding upon the destruction of one class of
property in order to save another which, in the judgment of the
legislature, is of greater value to the public."'14
What the Miller Court missed, of course, is that legislative
action was not required to resolve the conflict. In the absence of legis-
lation, the orchard owners would not have been left to suffer their
harm without recourse, as the Court seemed to indicate. Rather, the
parties would have been left either to negotiate a solution themselves
or to seek recourse in the courts in a private action-a nuisance ac-
tion. And, in such a setting, the court would be empowered to make
the fine distinctions and balancing of interests that such a close case
demands. By framing the issue as one in which legislative action was
inevitable and essential, the Court skewed the analysis and outcome
in such a way as to distort the application of the harm/benefit test and
to derail the correct resolution of the case.
More specifically, by finding that the legislature had a right to
draw a distinction based upon the relative economic values to the
public of the trees involved, the Miller Court converted the police
power from a power used to prevent public harm to a power used to
promote societal benefit-in effect, converging the police and eminent
domain powers and obliterating any distinction between the two.
Years later, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Penn
Central, 144reinforced the Miller Court's redefinition of the police power
as a tool intended to confer public benefit, rather than to prevent
public harm.145 In Penn Central, the Court rejected the property
owners' contention that cases such as Miller were based upon
prevention of a noxious use, finding that such "cases are better
understood as resting not on any supposed 'noxious' quality of the
prohibited uses but rather on the ground that the restrictions were
reasonably related to the implementation of a policy ... expected to
produce a widespread public benefit and applicable to all similarly
situated property."146 Thus, the "valid but competing uses" notion has
143. Id.
144. 438 U.S. at 125 (noting that "land-use regulations that destroyed or adversely affected
recognized real property interests" have been upheld when they promote "the health, safety,
morals, or general welfare" of the public).
145. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the dissent, challenged Justice Brennan's characteriza-
tion of the police power. Id. at 145 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In particular, Justice Rehnquist
explicitly stated that "[e]ach of the cases cited by the Court for the proposition that legislation
which severely affects some landowners but not others does not effect a 'taking' involved noxious
uses of property." Id. at 145 n.8 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
146. Id. at 134 n.30. The argument feeds directly into Justice Brennan's misguided "social
reciprocity" view of the average reciprocity of advantage rule. See notes 340-52 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Brennan's "social reciprocity" view).
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severely eroded the underlying constraining principles of the police
power.
A second example that commentators raising this criticism
often focus upon is that of an industrial user that locates in an un-
populated area, but over time finds itself surrounded by residential
users, who complain of the industrial user's emissions of noise or odor
or of other activities incompatible with residential uses. 147 The exam-
ple is typically drawn from Hadacheck v. Sebastian,14s a 1915 case in
which the Supreme Court upheld as a valid police power action a city
ordinance prohibiting the operation of a brickyard within specified
areas of the city limits. Years earlier, the defendant property owner
had located his brickyard in an unpopulated area originally outside
the city limits. Over time, the city limits expanded and residential
housing developed nearby. The city passed the challenged ordinance,
which prevented the brickyard owner from operating his business, and
which reduced the value of his property from $800,000 to $60,000. A
similar example is presented by Goldblatt v. Hempstead,149 in which
the Court upheld a city ordinance prohibiting excavation beneath the
water table within the city limits, effectively eliminating all produc-
tive use of the petitioner's existing sand and gravel pit. Although the
pit was a valuable land use, it was deemed incompatible with the
residential uses which had grown up around it over time.
Commentators have decried the results reached in cases such as
Hadacheck and Goldblatt, arguing that any harm resulted solely from
the "unfortunate juxtaposition of two lawful activities," 1 o0 and that the
"incompatibility" between uses was just as much the fault of the resi-
dential users as the industrial user. 5'
147. See, for example, Sax, 74 Yale L. J. at 49 (cited in note 37) ("The typical nuisance
situation is one in which a perfectly lawful industrial enterprise located on the outskirts of the
city suddenly finds itself in the midst of a new and unforeseen residential development.").
148. 239 U.S. 394 (1915). Similar examples are presented by St. Louis Poster Advertising
Co. v. St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269 (1919) (upholding billboard prohibition); Pierce Oil Corp. v. City of
Hope, 248 U.S. 498 (1919) (upholding regulation of storage of petroleum products in residential
areas); Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915) (upholding ban on livery stables in
central business district); Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623 (1912) (upholding ban on billiard
halls); Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City & County of San Francisco, 216 U.S. 358 (1910) (upholding
ban on interments); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. (7 Otto) 659 (1878) (upholding ban on
fertilizer plant within city limits). See Bettman, 37 Harv. L. Rev. at 841 (cited in note 80)
(discussing changed-conditions cases).
149. 369 U.S. 590 (1961).
150. Sax, 74 Yale L. J. at 49 (cited in note 37).
151. Michelman, 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 1198 (cited in note 39).
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In truth, however, the residential users can be faulted at most
for coming to the nuisance-an argument which Professor Freund had
little difficulty rejecting in his influential police power treatise15 2 and
which the courts also have been reluctant to embrace.'53 As Freund
noted, while an offensive industrial user is not a nuisance per se when
located in a particular place,
it may become so when the character of the neighborhood changes, and it is in
that case no defence either that it is conducted with great care, or that the
complaining public "has come to the nuisance." The theory is that no one can
by prior occupancy establish for himself a right to annoy or incommode the
public, or, as it has been put, that the "right of habitancy is superior to the
exigencies of trade."1
The situation brings to mind the hoary question of whether,
when a tree falls in an empty forest, it still makes a sound. The com-
plained-of externalities produced by the industrial user-noise, odor,
etc.-existed before the residential users were present. The only
distinction is that the prior owners of the (presumably vacant) neigh-
boring lands were not present to complain of the brickyard's opera-
tions. Denying relief to the current, discomposed owners, then, would
necessarily rest upon some notion of prescriptive use gained by the
industrial user as a result of the neighboring property owners' failure
to assert their rights in a timely fashion. The mere fact that the
brickyard was a lawful use at the time of its inception-i.e., that it
was located in an area originally zoned for such activities-does not
grant it a license to engage in nuisance-like behavior that inflicts
harm upon its neighbors.155
152. Freund, The Police Power § 529 at 561 (cited in note 15). Although a few courts have
fashioned creative remedies for the "coming to the nuisance" scenario, see, for example, Spur
Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972) (holding that the
defendant's feedlot could be enjoined as a nuisance but the complaining developer had to
indemnify the defendant), "[t]he prevailing rule is that in the absence of a prescriptive right, the
defendant cannot condemn the surrounding premises to endure his operation, and that the
purchaser is entitled to a reasonable use and enjoyment of his land to the same extent as any
other owner... " Keeton, et al., The Law of Torts § 88B at 635 (cited in note 139). See generally
Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain 118-20
(Harvard U., 1985).
153. See William L. Prosser, John W. Wade, and Victor E. Schwartz, Cases and Materials on
Torts 846 n.1 (Foundation, 8th ed. 1988) ("The majority rule is that the plaintiff is not barred
from recovery for either a public or a private nuisance by the sole fact that he 'comes to the
nuisance' by buying property adjoining it") (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 840D (1979)).
154. Freund, The Police Power § 529 at 561 (cited in note 15) (footnotes omitted).
155. Even opponents of the harm/benefit test concede that this is true. See generally
Michelman, 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 1242 (cited in note 39).
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Moreover, the Supreme Court early on put in place a protective
measure that would ensure judicial scrutiny of legislative deter-
minations of incompatible uses, such as those found in Hadacheck and
Goldblatt. In Dobbins v. Los Angeles,156 a 1904 case, the Court in-
validated a Los Angeles ordinance, finding an insufficient fit between
the ends sought by the regulation and the means used to achieve that
goal. In that case, the city enacted an ordinance outlining a district in
which gasworks could be built. In reliance upon the ordinance, the
appellant purchased property within the district, obtained a permit,
and laid the foundation for a gasworks. The city council then passed a
second ordinance which changed the district boundaries, rendering the
appellant's project illegal.
The Court stated that the second ordinance would be valid,
notwithstanding the appellant's reliance upon the first, if the opera-
tion of the gasworks or the changed character of the community ren-
dered the ban necessary to protect public health or safety. 157 The facts
before the Court indicated, however, that the gasworks could be con-
structed in a safe manner, that the project was not incompatible with
neighboring property uses, and that the community character had not
changed.158 In such an instance, the ordinance was not necessary to
protect the public health, safety, or welfare, and was thus an
"arbitrary and discriminatory exercise of the police power which
amounts to a taking of property.... .,159
Close examination, therefore, makes it evident that the "valid
but competing" uses argument rests on very shaky ground. In a true
instance of such uses, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to articu-
late a legitimate reason for an exercise of the police power. Miller is
such a difficult example. Although it may be a close call whether
either of the competing uses at stake in Miller could be said to be a
public nuisance, the final determination, where it is disputed, is
within the usual purview and competence of the courts. The legisla-
tive authority to regulate a public nuisance is unquestioned. If, on the
other hand, it turns out that neither of the uses is a nuisance, then
any legislative action taken by the state must be based in the eminent
domain power and accompanied by payment of just compensation to
the affected landowner.
156. 195 U.S. 223 (1904).
157. Id. at 238.
158. Id. at 238-40.
159. Id. at 241 (emphasis added).
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2. Inability to Distinguish Between Harm and Benefit
The second complaint raised against the harm/benefit test is
the allegation that it is impossible to distinguish between prevention
of a harm and conferment of a benefit. For example, Professor
Michelman has argued that the harm/benefit distinction "will not
work unless we can establish a benchmark of 'neutral' conduct which
enables us to say where refusal to confer benefits (not reversible with-
out compensation) slips over into readiness to inflict harms (reversible
without compensation).160 Similarly, Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority in Lucas, dismissed the harm/benefit test by noting that "the
distinction between 'harm-preventing' and 'benefit-conferring' regula-
tion is often in the eye of the beholder."'161 Thus, he found, "[o]ne could
say that imposing a servitude on Lucas's land is necessary in order to
prevent his use of it from 'harming' South Carolina's ecological re-
sources; or, instead, in order to achieve the 'benefits' of an ecological
preserve."'162 Noting that a harm-prevention rationale "can be formu-
lated in practically every case," he concluded: 'We think the Takings
Clause requires courts to do more than insist upon artful harm-pre-
venting characterizations."
63
Commentators, too, have engaged in the same sort of defini-
tional gymnastics, though often providing much more extreme exam-
ples.1 4 For example, Professor Rubenfeld argues:
Even if the state reached out and took money directly from my pocket, still we
could not say that here the state has merely expropriated a benefit and not
prevented harm. Perhaps the harm lay in my saving rather than consuming,
perhaps in my plan to consume one thing rather than another, or perhaps
simply in my having the money when others don't.
6 5
160. Michelman, 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 1197 (cited in note 39).
161. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003, 1024.
162. Id. (footnote omitted).
163. Id. at 1025-26 n.12.
164. See, for example, Robert Kratovil and Frank J. Harrison, Jr., Eminent Domain-Policy
and Concept, 42 Cal. L. Rev. 596, 608 (1954) (arguing that the distinction between "averting
detriment to the public and promoting the public advantage" is "a distinction without a
difference"); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., A Critical Reexamination of the Takings Jurisprudence, 90
Mich. L. Rev. 1892, 1934 (1992) ('In the absence of some accepted standard of proper conduct,
one may describe any government action equally well as extracting a benefit or preventing a
harm:'); Michelman, 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 1197 (cited in note 39) (noting that a regulation banning
billboards could be construed "as one which prevents the 'harm' of roadside blight and
distraction, or as one securing the 'benefits' of safety and amenity"); Sax, 74 Yale L. J. at 50
(cited in note 37) (noting that it is not always possible to determine whether the individual or the
public "caused" the harm complained of).
165. Rubenfeld, 102 Yale L. J. at 1099-1100 (cited in note 29) (footnote omitted).
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Moreover, Rubenfeld argued, when "pursued to its logical conclusion,"
the harmlbenefit test would obviate the need for compensation even in
clear cases of eminent domain:
If a piece of land is needed to complete a railroad that would maximize the
public interest, then any use of land other than to complete the railroad is in
fact harmful to the public. Or again: the very fact of one person's private
ownership of a piece of property could be found to have harmful effects,
warranting the state in its harm-preventing capacity to seize the property and
convert it to some other form of ownership.
166
Professor Epstein correctly dismisses such arguments as falling
within the "face gets in the way of the fist" category. 167 The question
ultimately is one of causation--did the property owner cause a harm
which the regulation seeks to prevent? In a 1972 article,168 Epstein
explored the role of causation in establishing prima facie tort liability,
an argument that provides a reasonably apt analogy for takings
analysis. He rejected the traditional formulation of the causation
question---"whether, but for the negligence of the defendant, the
plaintiff would not have been injured."' 69 Instead, Epstein postulated
that causation should reflect ordinary language usage by ordinary per-
sons.170 Thus, in a situation where A strikes B, the inquiry should not
focus on "but for" causation, because it is as easy to state that but for
B's standing in the way of A's fist, B would not have been struck as it
is to say that but for A's striking out, B would not have been injured.
However, ordinary people, using ordinary language, would inevitably
define the situation as "A hit B," thereby implicitly assigning causa-
tion and hence liability (absent a justifiable legal excuse) to A.1
71
166. Id. at 1100. An analogous argument was made by Professor Lunney. See Lunney, 6
Fordham Envir. L. J. at 437 (cited in note 42) ("Because government or even other private
individuals could have preemptively purchased the property rights and thereby prevented the
threatened harm, their failure to act is also a factual cause of the threatened harm.") (footnote
omitted).
167. Epstein, Takings at 117 (cited in note 152). Other commentators agree. See, for
example, William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics, and Politics 354 (Harvard U.,
1995) ("The question of the appropriate base point for compensation is not seriously addressed by
saying it all depends upon how you phrase it. 'Down' does not become 'up' just because one can
invert oneself on a trapeze.").
168. Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973).
169. Id. at 160.
170. Id.
171. Implicit within his argument is a requirement that A's action interfered with B's legal
rights. See Richard A. Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. Legal Stud. 391, 424-33 (1975). Epstein
has refined his original argument over the years. See, for example, Richard A. Epstein,
Causation-In Context: An Afterword, 63 Chi. Kent L. Rev. 653 (1987).
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Professor Ellickson made an analogous argument in a 1973
land use article, phrasing his position in terms of "ordinary speech."172
Drawing upon the example of a grocery store locating in a residential
neighborhood, Ellickson noted that some commentators would argue
that it is impossible to distinguish whether the grocer is harming the
residential users with its incompatible use, or the homeowners are
harming the grocer through their "sensitivities."1' s As Ellickson
stated, however:
In ordinary speech .... people consistently distinguish."harms" from "benefits"
and would agree that the grocery is doing the harming there. Evaluative terms
like good, bad, beneficial, and harmful are easily used because people have
remarkably consistent perceptions of normal conditions and thus can agree in
characterizing deviations from normalcy. In any community, observers empiri-
cally establish standards of normal conduct for repetitive activities; people
largely agree on normal clothes styles or normal behavior in public places.
Similarly there is considerable agreement on the identification of normal land
uses .... 
174
Ellickson went on in a 1977 article to re-articulate this normal
behavior model, which posited a standard higher than nuisance law
but which nonetheless imposed some limits on governmental
regulation of land use.175 "Normal behavior," in his model, was defined
by community practice.
76
In his recent book, Professor Fischel adopted Ellickson's
normal behavior standard, arguing that "the appropriate base point
for compensation" is determined by what "ordinary citizens" regard as
normal within their communities. 177 Similarly, Professor Freyfogle
172. Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as
Land Use Controls, 40 U. Chi. L. Rev. 681, 729 (1973).
173. Id. at 728-29 (citing R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1, 34-35
(1960); Michelman, 80 Harv. L. Rev. at 1196-1201, 1235-45 (cited in note 39)).
174. Id. at 729. Professor Freyfogle recently made a similar argument, contending that in
evaluating a takings claim involving ecologically sensitive lands, a court should begin by
"assessing whether the landowner's proposed use is deemed harmful by the community under its
then.prevailing norms," or, for other takings claims, "whether the new rule sets an ownership
norm of generalized applicability." Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands,
43 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 77, 124 & n.161 (1995).
175. Robert C. Ellickson, Suburban Growth Controls: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 86
Yale L. J. 385, 418-24, 468-69 (1977) (proposing legal rules to determine when a community can
or cannot regulate land use without providing compensation).
176. Professor Peterson offered a similar theory in which she argued that the Court should
not find a taking where the regulation is intended to prevent or punish action (or inaction) that
the public would likely consider wrongful. Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause: In Search of
Underlying Principles Part H-Takings as Intentional Deprivations of Property Without Moral
Justification, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 55, 85-93 (1990). The consistency of the public's "ordinary percep-
tions of the world" would make the outcome in most cases relatively obvious. Id. at 91-92.
177. Fischel, Regulatory Takings at 354 (cited in note 167).
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has argued that "[w]hen courts long ago applied the nuisance law in
actual cases, they did so in the only way that they could, by drawing
on the community's sense of acceptable and unacceptable land use.
They turned to the community's sense of value... because it was the
standard that made the most sense, the standard that comported best
with the idea of law as the people's will."178
Whether one calls it ordinary causation, ordinary speech, nor-
mal behavior, or the community's sense of value, the principle pro-
vides a rough-and-ready analytical tool for resolving most takings
questions as well.179 Although the principle is not exactly apt for all
takings issues, it is reasonably and sufficiently close. In Hadacheck,
for example, ordinary people would describe the situation as one in
which the brickyard intruded upon residential uses, rather than the
residential uses intruding upon the brickyard, and with good reason.
The residential users produce no externalities that conflict with the
brickyard's intended operations, other than their utterly
understandable desire to use their property for ordinary,
unexceptional uses. The same cannot be said of the brickyard.180
Even the difficult Miller case lends itself to resolution on these
grounds. The apple tree owners did not infringe on the rights of
others by having their orchards, since their activities were perfectly
lawful and contained within their own grounds. The cedar tree
owners, on the other hand, were, albeit inadvertently and passively,
the cause of injury to property outside their own borders.
178. Freyfogle, 43 U.C.LA. L. Rev. at 123 (cited in note 174).
179. But see Lunney, 6 Fordham Envir. L. J. at 519 (cited in note 42) (arguing that
Epstein's "notion of ordinary causation, while intuitively attractive .... is inappropriate for direct
application to resolve the takings issue"). The notions apply in broad terms, and no argument is
made here that they are exactly apt for all takings issues. However, neither would I accept
Professor Lunney's position that Epstein's argument is irrelevant to the takings arena. See id. at
514-19 (describing "ordinary" causation and takings). Lunney's position seems to be based in
part upon his finding that applying ordinary causation to takings would not promote deterrence
of similarly undesirable government behavior, id. at 515, and in part upon his assertion that
ordinary causation may not recognize the situations in which a "forced sale" is most advanta-
geous in terms of fairness or efficiency. Id. at 517.
180. The Supreme Court has also adopted the notion of ordinary causation in the sense of
stating that the party who "caused" the harm can legitimately be made to pay for correcting it.
See, for example, Atchinson, 346 U.S. at 353 ("Having brought about the problem, the railroads
are in no position to complain.").
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3. The Interjection of Nuisance Law
A third argument raised against the harm/benefit test is that it
embodies notions of nuisance law-an area of law long criticized as
being unacceptably vague and unpredictable. For example, Justice
Blackmun noted: "There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in
the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance' .... It is
an area of law that straddles the legal universe, virtually defies syn-
thesis, and generates case law to suit every taste."'s' Commentators
likewise have criticized both nuisance law in general and Justice
Scalia's recent modification of nuisance law in the context of takings
law in Lucas as increasing doctrinal ambiguity and unpredictability in
this already confusing field.182
That Justice Scalia did not outright reject nuisance law as a
gauge for identifying takings, however, indicates its essential role in
takings law. Unless we embrace the notion that government can
never regulate land use without paying compensation (and even the
Lucas Court was unwilling to go that far), we must have some method
for evaluating the legitimacy of government regulation. Nuisance law
provides a time-tested mechanism for making such a determination.
As noted above, 183 the most recent and most complete articula-
tion of the nuisance exception came in the 1992 Supreme Court deci-
sion in Lucas. The Lucas Court's discussion of the nuisance exception
is hardly without problem, however. For example, commentators have
criticized the Court's tying of the validity of land use regulation to the
state common law of nuisance. As Professor Byrne argued, Lucas
"reverses the majoritarian premise of every state's constitution,
181. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1055 n.19 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
182. See, for example, J. Peter Byrne, Ten Arguments for the Abolition of the Regulatory
Takings Doctrine, 22 Ecol. L. Q. 89, 113 (1995) ("The vagueness of nuisance law requires courts
to make loosely guided policy judgments about the comparative harms and benefits of competing
uses of land."); William W. Fisher, III, The Trouble With Lucas, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 1393, 1407
(1993) ("[W]hat is most striking about the holding of Lucas is that it embeds in the already
muddy law of takings... the even muddier law of nuisance... !).
It is important for critics of the nuisance exception to note, however, that the interjection of
nuisance law into takings law is a double-edged sword. While principles of nuisance law may be
used to characterize a regulation as harm-preventing, and thus not a taking of private property,
the principles have also been used to protect private property from confiscatory acts. In Richards
v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546 (1914), for example, the Supreme Court held that a
legislature could not insulate a railroad from liability for noxious gases and smoke that intruded
onto a private owner's land. The Court stated that "while the legislature may legalize what
otherwise would be a public nuisance, it may not confer immunity from action for a private
nuisance of such a character as to amount in effect to a taking of private property for public use."
Id. at 553.
183. See notes 119-34 and accompanying text (discussing Lucas).
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namely, that legislation supersedes common law rules."'184 Moreover,
because Justice Scalia made it clear in Lucas that a state court's char-
acterization of nuisance law would be scrutinized carefully to make
certain that it was based on "an objectively reasonable application of
precedent,"'185 federal courts evaluating takings claims will henceforth
be much more embroiled in interpretation of state common law than is
normally the case-a situation which, as Professor Fisher noted, may
well "lead to considerable awkwardness and resentment."1 86 Finally,
because by its very nature nuisance law continues to evolve, it does
not provide the solid benchmark against which the Court can avoid
the ad hoc decisions that have characterized its modern takings opin-
ions. 8 7
Perhaps the biggest flaw in the use of nuisance law in takings
analysis, however, is the Court's own waffling on the manner in which
it should apply. Nuisance law is no newcomer to takings analysis.
Though commentators speak of Justice Rehnquist's creation of the
"nuisance exception" in Penn Central and the Court's adoption of the
exception in Keystone,18 nuisance law has played a substantial,
though varied, role in the harm/benefit test and in takings law in
general for a long time. 18 9 The early Court made no determined effort
to articulate the scope or role of nuisance law in takings analysis. The
Mugler Court, for example, explicitly discussed nuisance law and
noxious uses in its original articulation of the harm/benefit test, but
without defining its boundaries. 90 While the Mahon Court subse-
quently dismissed nuisance law as a controlling or influencing factor
184. Byrne, 22 Ecol. L.Q. at 113 (cited in note 182). See also John A. Humbach, Evolving
Thresholds of Nuisance and the Takings Clause, 18 Colum. J. Envir. L. 1, 3 (1993) ("Ironically,
[under Lucas,] future legislative efforts to remedy deficiencies in the common law of nuisance can
now be overturned precisely because the common law fails to protect people from the particular.
harm in question."). Professor Kmiec counters that nuisance law is the traditional vehicle used
to balance individual property rights and public interests, and that state courts are bound by
precedent and clothed with a general cloak of disinterest which state legislatures, with their
political agendas and ad hoc decision making, conspicuously lack. Douglas Kmiec, At Last, The
Supreme Court Solves the Takings Puzzle, 19 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol. 147, 153 (1995).
185. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1032 n.18.
186. Fisher, 45 Stan. L. Rev. at 1407 (cited in note 182). One might question, however,
which is (or ought to be) the greater jurisprudential concern: avoiding stepping on the toes of
state courts, or protecting individual constitutional rights.
187. Id. at 1407-08 (noting that "the answer to the question of whether a challenged land
use regulation could have been effected through the state's nuisance law will sometimes depend
upon the date as of which the state's nuisance law is measured").
188. See Part lI-A2 (discussing the development of the nuisance exception).
189. See Conners, 19 Cap. U. L. Rev. at 139 (cited in note 42).
190. See notes 44-57 and accompanying text (discussing Mugler).
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in its decision, 91 four years later the Euclid Court found it provided a
"helpful" analogy. 192
The Court's opinions do not make it clear whether the Court
perceived noxious uses and nuisances to be interchangeable, nor
whether the Court believed that the harms encompassed within the
harm/benefit test were more expansive than private or public nui-
sances. Not until Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central was any
suggestion provided as to the scope of the nuisance exception, and
even that was only the elliptical statement that the exception was not
"coterminous with the police power."' 93 Chief Justice Rehnquist's two
"narrowing principles" in his Keystone dissent-that the nuisance
exception does not embrace "economic" concerns and that the excep-
tion could not be used to extinguish all use of private prop-
erty'9,-provided only marginally more explication.
Justice Scalia's articulation of the nuisance exception in Lucas
provided an even narrower version of the exception than that sug-
gested in Justice Rehnquist's earlier opinions. Justice Scalia seized
upon Justice Rehnquist's observation that the nuisance exception had
never been permitted to completely extinguish a property interest, and
articulated a very narrow per se test that essentially froze nuisance
law in time. Lucas held that a regulation could not completely extin-
guish a property interest or destroy all profitable use, unless the same
result could have been reached under the State's "background princi-
ples" of nuisance and property law already in place. 95 By articulating
such a test, Justice Scalia proposed to do away with the difficulties
and uncertainties of the harm/benefit test.
As Justice Blackmun noted in his dissent in Lucas, however,
nuisance law itself requires state courts to engage in the same type of
harm/benefit analysis that Justice Scalia had attempted to reject.'9
Justice Scalia responded to this criticism by emphasizing that "an
affirmative decree eliminating all economically beneficial uses may be
defended only if an objectively reasonable application of relevant
precedents would exclude those beneficial uses in the circumstances in
191. See note 68 and accompanying text (discussing Mahon's treatment of nuisance law).
192. Euclid, 272 U.S. 386-87. See notes 72-80 and accompanying text (discussing Euclid).
193. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 145 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See note 98 and
accompanying text (discussing Penn Central).
194. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). See notes 110-18 and
accompanying text (discussing Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Keystone).
195. See notes 126-34 and accompanying text (discussing Lucas).
196. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1054-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("Common-law public and
private nuisance law is simply a determination whether a particular use causes harm.").
1484 [Vol. 50:1449
TAKINGS ANAL YSIS
which the land is presently found."'197 Two years later, in his dissent
for denial of certiorari in Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach,198 Justice
Scalia made clear his belief that a "more objective" evaluation of state
nuisance law was required when he again emphasized that states may
not avoid takings "by invoking nonexistent rules of state substantive
law," adding that "[o]ur opinion in Lucas... would be a nullity if
anything that a state court chooses to denominate 'background
law'-regardless of whether it really is such-could eliminate property
rights."'s
Because nuisance law is continually evolving, it does not pro-
vide a fixed benchmark by which the Court can avoid the ad hoc deci-
sions that have characterized its modern takings opinions. Yet the
inherent flexibility of nuisance law can just as easily be viewed as an
advantage, because it allows the law to adapt readily to changing
times and circumstances. Although some analysts are made uncom-
fortable by the unpredictability of outcomes in the nuisance area, it is
patently unreasonable to expect much certainty in areas as fact-
specific and behavior-dominated as either nuisance or takings law.
We might be better satisfied with a correct, or justifiable, outcome,
rather than waiting in vain for a predictable one.
C. The Harm/Benefit Test: A Summary
In Lucas, Justice Scalia rejected the harm/benefit test, finding
that "the distinction between regulation that 'prevents harmful use'
and that which 'confers benefits' is difficult, if not impossible, to dis-
cern on an objective, value-free basis."2°0 Rather, "[w]hether one or the
other of the competing characterizations will come to one's lips in a
particular case depends primarily upon one's evaluation of the worth
of competing uses of real estate."
20' 1
What Justice Scalia does not discuss is why such an "objective,
value-free" basis is needed in takings law, especially when values play
such a large role in other areas of constitutional law. As the Euclid
Court noted seventy years ago, notions of legitimate land use
necessarily change over time, as populations grow denser and
197. Id. at 1032 n.18.
198. 510 U.S. 1207, 1207 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
199. Id. at 1211 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of cert.).
200. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.
201. Id. at 1025.
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understandings of the effects of land use change.2 2 So, for example,
while a century ago compulsory drainage of wetlands was regarded as
a social good, today preservation of wetlands is generally viewed as
necessary for protecting the environment.20
3
The real issue is how the legal system should respond to peri-
ods of fluctuating public norms. Although one can fashion complex
theories to address this situation,24 at some level all that is needed is
a healthy dose of common sense-a principle that seems increasingly
divorced from takings analysis. The mere facts that the courts are not
overrun with takings cases brought by disaffected property owners
and that state and local governments are not too paralyzed to regulate
suggest that public and private actors are able to deduce what is and
is not acceptable regulation in most contexts.2 5 Of course, some cases
will clearly fall at the edges, where classification of the legislative
action as either preventing a harm or conferring a benefit will be
much more difficult. Lucas is a paradigmatic example of the difficult,
marginal case.
202. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 386-87. The Euclid Court stated:
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but, with the great increase and
concentration of population, problems have developed, and constantly are developing,
which require, and will continue to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use
and occupation of private lands in urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom,
necessity, and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that
they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably
would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are sustained,
under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to those which justify
traffic regulations, which, before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit street
railways, would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this
there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies,
the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different
conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a changing
world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise.
Id.
203. See, for example, Freyfogle, 43 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. at 80-88 (cited in note 174) (discussing
wetlands regulation and takings law).
204. Fischel would address the problem through a process-theory approach that would favor
decisions made at higher levels of government (for example, the state level) rather than lower
levels (for example, the local level). As Fischel states:
Where does this leave the normal-behavior standard, wherein judges have to decide what
is normal, when normalcy is not a constant? The key to the judges' role is the level of
government that adopts the new and higher standard of normal behavior. My idea is
that the larger republics are more appropriate sources of declarations of what is normal
behavior for property owners. This is not because I think state legislatures are unerring
readers of the public pulse, but because they are no worse at it than judges.
Fischel, Regulatory Takings at 354-55 (cited in note 167).
205. Many commentators have implicitly recognized this. See, for example, Peterson, 78
Cal. L. Rev. at 91-92 (cited in note 176) (arguing that "widely shared judgments of wrongdoing"
render many takings disputes "easy cases").
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Nonetheless, the intuitive pull of the implicit notions of the
harm/benefit test is self-evident even within Justice Scalia's own
opinions. His rejection of the harm/benefit test in Lucas is difficult to
reconcile with his 1988 opinion in Pennell v. City of San Jose,206 where
he contended that no compensation is required for a regulation if
"there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the property use
restricted by [a] regulation and the social evil that the regulation
seeks to remedy."2 7 Justice Scalia stated in Pennell that "since the
owner's use of the property is (or, but for the regulation, would be) the
source of the social problem, it cannot be said that he has been singled
out unfairly."208 He then concluded that stricter rent control restric-
tions on housing occupied by poor tenants could not be justified be-
cause the landlords are no more responsible for their tenants' poverty
than are "the grocers who sell needy renters their food, or the depart-
ment stores that sell them their clothes, or the employers who pay
them their wages... "209 In Pennell, therefore, Justice Scalia did
consider whether the actions of the property owner were the cause of
the social ill that the regulation was intended to address-in effect, he
evaluated whether the regulation addressed a harm created by the
regulated property owner.
210
Moreover, the harm/benefit test offers certain advantages not
found in other formulations of taking tests,21 ' not least of which is its
inherent flexibility. In a 1971 article, Professor Sax argued that the
traditional view of property rights, which examines only those activi-
ties occurring within the physical limits of the owner's property, failed
to accommodate modern scientific knowledge and the realities of
property use.212 Rather, he argued, property is more correctly viewed
"as an interdependent network of competing uses."213 It is certainly
true that modern science has provided us with a much greater, though
still incomplete, understanding of land and the environment as an
206. 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
207. Id. at 20 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In effect, Justice Scalia
was stating one-half of the creation-of-harm test. See notes 81-87 and accompanying text
(discussing the creation-of-harm test).
208. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 20 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
209. Id. at 21 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
210. See generally Fisher, 45 Stan. L. Rev. at 1395-97 (cited in note 182).
211. For a discussion of these tests, see generally Andrea L. Peterson, The Takings Clause:
In Search of Underlying Principles Part I-A Critique of Current Takings Clause Doctrine, 77
Cal. L. Rev. 1301 (1989).





interconnected, interrelated whole. It is also true that this new
knowledge and understanding alters our definitions of acceptable
regulations and permissible property uses. Because the harm/benefit
test is based in notions of nuisance law-itself a flexible and mutable
legal doctrine-it has the ability to adapt to new scientific knowledge
and new understandings of the externalities created by even tradi-
tional or commonplace uses of property.
A principled application of the harm/benefit test will take care
of most cases, which are, after all, essentially easy ones. Although
difficult cases, such as Lucas, do not lend themselves to such facile
analysis, that hardly means the harm/benefit test does not work. It
simply indicates that the analysis must not stop with a blind appli-
cation of the test.
Proper application of police power analysis will eliminate the
difficulty of distinguishing between harms and benefits. Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission,214 for example, addressed a state regu-
lation that conditioned issuance of a building permit for a beachfront
house on the property owners' agreeing to grant an easement to the
public to traverse their private beach. The Nollan majority character-
ized the regulation as requiring the property owners to dedicate pri-
vate land to public uses-a form of benefit extraction.215 In his dis-
sent, however, Justice Brennan characterized the action as
"preservation of public access to the ocean and tidelands"--a form of
harm prevention.21 6
Although this case seems to me to be a clear case of benefit-
extraction, not harm-prevention, we need not choose between these
two characterizations. Rather, we could simply take the formulation
that is most favorable to the state-that the action prevents a
harm-and examine it to see if it is valid under the police power.
Although the government action at stake is undeniably legitimate
-protection of public access to public beaches-the means chosen to
achieve it bear little relationship to that interest, and the burden
inflicted upon the property owner is excessive. The regulation should
thus be struck down as an invalid exercise of the police power. 217
Although the harm/benefit test's role is merely to demonstrate
under which power the government action should be analyzed, the role
is nonetheless a crucial one. The test is necessary to provide a deline-
214. 483 U.S 825 (1987).
215. Id. at 831.
216. Id. at 843-44 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
217. For a fuller explication of the police power analysis, see Oswald, 70 Wash. L. Rev. at
144-45 (cited in note 3).
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ation between the eminent domain and police powers; that delineation
itself is necessary to ensure that the line between compensable tak-
ings and noncompensable regulations remains clear and distinct.
IV. THE AVERAGE RECIPROCITY OF ADVANTAGE RULE
The "average reciprocity of advantage" rule was the second of
the two tools developed by the early Supreme Court to draw the criti-
cal distinction between valid and invalid police power acts.
218
Although most government regulations that confer a benefit are com-
pensable takings, the average reciprocity of advantage rule identifies
a critical subset of government actions that, although they convey a
private or mixed public/private benefit, are nonetheless valid police
power actions.
The rule has undergone substantial change since its genesis in
the early part of the twentieth century. Simply put, in its original
form, the rule stated that a land use regulation that resulted in bene-
fits to regulated landowners roughly equal to the burdens imposed on
them did not violate the United States Constitution. In its modern,
corrupted form, however, the average reciprocity of advantage rule
states that if a land use regulation results in benefits to society as a
whole roughly equal to the burdens imposed upon the regulated land-
owners, no taking has occurred. As a result of this perversion, the
average reciprocity of advantage rule has lost its former potency as a
tool for distinguishing valid police power actions from invalid regula-
tory takings and instead has become a method for simply rubber-
stamping legislative acts.
218. The doctrine was developed in a fairly small set of cases, however. Only seven
Supreme Court cases actually use the phrase "average reciprocity of advantage." See Dolan, 512
U.S. at 408 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1018; Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715
(1986); Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491; Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415; Jackman v. Rosenbaum, 260 U.S. 22, 30 (1922). See also Nollan, 483
U.S. at 856 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (referring to "reciprocity of advantage").
The rule has received considerably less attention from commentators than has the
harm/benefit test. See, for example, Raymond R. Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and
Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory of Takings Jurisprudence, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. 297
(1990) (discussing average reciprocity of advantage); Conners, 19 Cap. U. L. Rev. at 173-75 (cited
in note 42) (same); Hippler, Comment, 14 B.C. Envir. Aff. L. J. at 653 (cited in note 42) (same).
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A. Historical Development of the Rule
The "average reciprocity of advantage" rule was originally
articulated by Justice Holmes in two early, influential
cases--Jackman v. Rosenbaum Co.219 and Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon. 20 Even before Justice Holmes uttered this specific phrase,
however, the notion of reciprocity had existed as a way of limiting and
defining the scope of the police power. The courts and commentators
had long recognized that the police power must be supported by more
than mere incidental benefits to the public, for virtually every
regulation will further the health, safety, and welfare of the public to
some extent. Thus, in his famous and influential constitutional law
treatise, Judge Cooley stated:
It may be for the public benefit that all the wild lands of the State be improved
and cultivated, all the low lands drained, all the unsightly places beautified, all
dilapidated buildings replaced by new; because all these things tend to give an
aspect of beauty, thrift, and comfort to the country, and thereby to invite set-
tlement, increase the value of lands, and gratify the public taste; but the
common law has never sanctioned an appropriation of property based upon
these considerations alone; and some further element must therefore be
involved before the appropriation can be regarded as sanctioned by our
constitutions.
221
One such "further element" to be recognized by the Supreme Court
was the existence of a common scheme: Where a regulation resulted
in merely an incidental benefit to the public, it could be upheld under
the police power if it provided reciprocal benefits and burdens to a
specific group of property owners. In such cases, each landowner is
forced to bear a regulatory burden, but each shares in the benefit of a
concerted action necessary to recognize the full potential of interre-
lated, interconnected lands. Jackman and Mahon drew upon this
category of cases, as well as special-assessment cases,222 in establish-
ing the average reciprocity of advantage rule.
219. 260 U.S. 22, 30 (1922).
220. 260 U.S. at 415. See notes 58-71 and accompanying text for discussion of Mahon.
221. Thomas M. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 660 (Little, Brown, 5th ed. 1883)
(emphasis added).
222. See notes 256-62 and accompanying text (discussing special-assessment cases).
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1. Jackman and Its Progenitors
Justice Holmes first coined the phrase "average reciprocity of
advantage" in 1922 in Jackman.22 The complaining property owner
there challenged a state party wall statute, alleging that it violated
the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment because it
permitted the regulation of property for the benefit of a private
individual (the neighboring property owner) rather than for the
benefit of the community as a whole, and because it provided no
compensation for land physically occupied and appropriated by the
neighboring property owner.224 The complaining property owner had a
theater, one wall of which was situated along the property line.225 The
neighboring property owner attempted to build a party wall along the
line, intending to incorporate the existing theater wall into the new
party wall. Because of structural defects in the existing wall, the
neighbor was forced by the city to remove it.226 The theater owner
sued.
227
Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, noted that the
lower court had upheld the challenged statute in reliance upon the
state's power "to impose burdens upon property or to cut down its
value in various ways without compensation, as a branch of what is
called the police power."22 Justice Holmes went on to state: "The
exercise of this has been held warranted in some cases by what we
may call the average reciprocity of advantage, although the advan-
tages may not be equal in the particular case."22 Having tossed out
this ambiguous and undefined phrase, Justice Holmes then stated
that the Court did not need to consider this ground for upholding the
state statute, for the two-hundred-year history of the state party wall
statute rendered it impervious to Fourteenth Amendment challenge.2 30
223. 260 U.S. at 30. Although the phrase sounds awkward and ambiguous to the modem
reader, Justice Holmes was quite proud of it. See Howe, 1 Letters at 466 (cited in note 70) ("In
this [opinion] I coined the formula 'average reciprocity of advantage' which I think neatly ex-
pressed the rationale of certain cases ...
224. Jackman, 260 U.S. at 23-29.
225. Id. at 29.
226. Id.
227. The plaintiff sued only for the loss of rent on the theater for one rental season and for
the costs of restoring the theater to its original condition. Id.
228. Id. at 30.
229. Id. (citing Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist.
v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896); Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U.S. 606 (1885)).
230. Id. at 30-31. Compare Freund, The Police Power § 442 (cited in note 15) (noting that a
neighbor gains no benefit from construction of a party wall unless he incorporates it into his own
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The three cases cited by Justice Holmes in support of this
"average reciprocity of advantage" dicta, Wurts v. Hoagland,231 Noble
State Bank v. Haskell,232 and Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Bradley,23
shed some light on what the Court had in mind, but without actually
clarifying the notion. These cases were viewed as furthering "common
schemes" and hence as not warranting payment of compensation.
Professor Freund, in his turn-of-the-century treatise on the police
power, explained the common-scheme cases as follows:
While in general, a person will not be compelled to improve his land in a
particular manner, the principle suffers some modification where the
improvement (without being strictly or directly public, though perhaps
remotely and indirectly so) is common to several adjoining estates. In one
aspect the compulsion is exercised in favor of other persons, and thus
resembles the legislation allowing the construction of private ways, drains, and
ditches across the lands of others .... But in the cases to be now considered
the owner whose land is affected by the exercise of the power shares in the
benefit of the improvement to which he is made to contribute, and because he
does so share he may be compelled to bear a part of the cost of the joint
enterprise.
234
Freund noted that basing such acts upon the existence of a public
benefit, such as protection of the public health was "in many cases
rather a specious plea than a reality."2 5 Thus, he concluded:
It is true that ordinarily an owner will not be forced to improve his land merely
to increase the general prosperity of the country; nor will one party be forced
into a partnership with another because the interests of both can be better
served by joint than by individual action. But lands may be so situated toward
each other as to create a mutual dependence and a natural community. The
exercise of the police power then consists in applying to this community the
structure) and id. § 443 (citing a French jurist who criticized party wall statutes as a violation of
private property interests and who argued that such legislation is not excused by its lengthy
pedigree).
231. 114 U.S. 606 (1885).
232. 219 U.S. 104 (1911).
233. 164 U.S. 112 (1896).
234. Freund, The Police Power § 440 (cited in note 15) (footnote omitted). See also Philip
Nichols, 1 The Law of Eminent Domain 289 (M. Bender, 2d. ed. 1917):
When a tract of such land is divided into several parcels held by different owners and a
general improvement of the whole cannot be effected without the harmonious co-
operation of all the owners, the common necessity is met and the common interest
secured by the intervention of the state, and the individual rights of each owner are
subjected to such modifications as seem most adapted to secure the best advantage of all.
235. Freund, The Police Power § 442 (cited in note 15). Freund stated that it was difficult to
identify public health benefits from irrigation and noted that if public health were the true




same principle of majority rule which is recognised, as a matter of course, for
local purposes in larger neighborhoods constituting political subdivisions.
2 3 6
The lineage of the common-scheme cases cited in Jackman is
complex. Wurts and Fallbrook Irrigation District both relied upon an
1884 case, Head v. Amoskeag Manufacturing Co. 237 Head involved a
challenge to the New Hampshire general mill act, which permitted
certain mill owners to erect mills and dams that resulted in the
flooding of the lands of others, provided that the mill owner paid
damages to the affected property owner. 238 The plaintiff challenged
the statute, alleging that it resulted in a taking of private property for
private, rather than public, use, and as such violated his due process
rights2' 9 The Head Court declined to address this issue, finding that
the case could be decided on narrower grounds relating to the joint use
of land adjacent to a stream by the property owners.240  The Court
stated:
When property, in which several persons have a common interest, cannot be
fully and beneficially enjoyed in its existing condition, the law often provides a
way in which they may compel one another to submit to measures necessary to
secure its beneficial enjoyment, making equitable compensation to any whose
control of or interest in the property is thereby modified.241
Thus, the Court noted, the law had long recognized the right of a
tenant in common or joint tenant to compel a partition242 or to compel
other co-owners to pay their fair share of repair costs on joint prop-
erty.243 Similarly, state statutes had long authorized the majority of
owners in severalty of contiguous lands to arrange for the drainage or
improvement of such lands and to apportion the cost of such measures
among all the owners "in proportion to the benefits received,... inde-
pendently of any effect upon the public health, as reasonable regula-
tions for the general advantage of those who are treated for this pur-
pose as owners of a common property"244--i.e., common-scheme cases.
236. Id.
237. 113 U.S. 9 (1885) (cited in Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. at 163).'
238. Id. at 16.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 20-21.
241. Id. at 21.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 21-22.
244. Id. at 22. The Court also provided a maritime law example: Where the owners of a
ship cannot agree upon its employment, a court of admiralty can authorize the majority to send it
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The Head Court found that the facts before it presented an
even stronger case for the intervention of state law. Beneficial use of
streams, such as the placement of grist or manufacturing mills, often
requires that the streams be dammed or diverted. Such uses, though
privately owned, nonetheless further the public interest by providing a
necessary service. 245 Damming or diversion, however, often results in
the flooding of the land of upstream owners, which gives rise to reme-
dies of damages or injunctions. 246 In the absence of state legislation,
an impasse could result in which no riparian owner would be able to
put the stream to its best and highest use; the public good would
suffer as a consequence. General mill acts avoided this problem by
permitting the damming of streams provided that damages or
compensation were paid to those upstream owners whose land was
flooded.247 The Head Court viewed such mill acts not as a tool by
which private property was confiscated for use by other private actors,
but rather as a means for regulating the rights of riparian owners "in
a manner best calculated, on the whole, to promote and secure their
common rights in it. ' '248
The Head Court's analysis is troubling. Head did not truly
involve a common-scheme use, as everyone's property was not being
improved; rather, some individuals were permitted to damage other
people's properties provided that they paid for the privilege of doing
so. 249 Moreover, the large element of public interest at stake seemed to
sway the Court's analysis,250 suggesting that what was really occurring
was a confiscation of private property for public use, but with private,
not public compensation.
to sea, indemnifying the minority against loss but denying it the right to share in the profits of
the voyage or the compensation for the use of the ship. Id. at 22-23.
245. Id. at 24 (finding that the justification for mill acts rests "partly upon the interest
which the community at large has in the use and employment of mills").
246. Id. at 23.
247. For a discussion of mill acts and their role in promoting economic development in early
America, see Morton J. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860, at 47-53
(1977). For a discussion of the judicial history of mill acts, see Head, 113 U.S. at 16-20; Nichols,
1 Eminent Domain §§ 83-84 (cited in note 234).
248. Head, 113 U.S. at 25 (quoting Bates v. Weymouth Iron Co., 62 Mass (8 Gush.) 548, 552-
53 (1852)).
249. See also Freund, The Police Power § 442 (cited in note 15) (finding that mill acts are
less justifiable than compulsory drainage or irrigation acts because mill acts "lack[ ] the element
of joint benefit').
250. See, for example, Head, 113 U.S. at 24 (noting the interest of "the community at large"
in the use and employment of mills); id. at 25 (stating that mill acts permit owners to use their
property for their own advantage "and for the benefit of the community") (quoting Bates, 62
Mass. at 553).
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Nonetheless, Wurts and Falibrook Irrigation District both re-
lied upon Head as precedent. These two cases did not involve mill
acts, but rather both involved state statutes designed to modify exist-
ing land conditions on designated parcels for the general benefit of all
owners of such parcels-i.e., they were true common-scheme cases 251
and thus fall more comfortably into the category of cases that the
average reciprocity of advantage rule was meant to reach.252
In Fallbrook Irrigation District, the Supreme Court upheld a
California irrigation act against allegations that it effected a taking of
private property without due process of law.23 The act authorized
assessments against properties located within designated irrigation
districts and set forth a procedure for the seizure and sale of land
where payment was not made. The complaining property owner al-
leged first that the statute did not serve a public purpose because it
benefited primarily the landowners whose property was within the
irrigation district; any benefit to the public, the property owner
charged, was only the "indirect and collateral benefit" that the public
received from any useful land improvement made within the state.2 54
The Court dismissed this claim, noting that the irrigation and produc-
tive use of millions of acres of otherwise "worthless" land necessarily
251. In the case of Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., however, the Court did not appear to recognize
it as such. See generally notes 253-62 and accompanying text.
252. Professor Hart's recent study calls into question whether drainage acts did indeed
benefit all affected owners. See Hart, 109 Harv. L. Rev. at 1269-72 (cited in note 45). Tidal and
inland marshes and meadows were not idle, unusable lands, but rather were valued as low-
maintenance hayfields. Id. at 1269. Affluent property owners seeking to engage in more capital-
intensive agricultural production would benefit from drainage projects, but those wishing to
engage in more traditional farming would not. Id. at 1271.
253. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. at 156. The property owner also claimed that: (1)
the basis for assessment under the act was not necessarily in proportion to the benefits conferred
by the mandated improvement scheme; (2) the act did not exempt lands that were productive
even in the absence of legislation; (3) the act failed to grant individual landowners hearings to
determine whether their lands could benefit from the irrigation scheme; and (4) the act would re-
quire owners of land who could not benefit from irrigation to pay the costs of providing such an
improvement to landowners who could so benefit. Id. at 156-57. The Court rejected each of these
claims. See id. at 164-70 (finding that the act provided an adequate scheme for determining
which lands should be included); id. at 170-75 (finding that the rights to a hearing provided
under the act were adequate); id. at 175-77 (dismissing the fourth allegation as being essentially
the same as the one alleging that the burdens were not distributed in proportion to benefits
received and finding that "the way of arriving at the amount may be in some instances
inequitable and unequal, but that is far from rising to the level of a constitutional problem and
far from a case of taking property without due process of law").
254. Id. at 156.
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serves the public interest, even though the lands are privately
owned. 25
5
Fallbrook Irrigation District was decided during the time pe-
riod in which the courts were attempting to hash out the rules ad-
dressing special assessments.26 Special-assessment districts were
regarded as a particular form of "benefit" tax.2 57 In general, the rules
stated that where public improvement resulted in a special benefit to
a specific class of owners-such as property owners abutting a new
public highway-those owners could be required to pay for the costs of
such improvements, at least to the extent they received a special
benefit.258 This requirement rested on the general principle that "he
who reaps the benefit should bear the burden,"259 even where the
255. Id. at 161-62. The Court's lengthy discussion of whether a public use existed, id. at
158-63, is misplaced and reflects the Court's confusion of two separate underlying theories about
state regulation of property. In part, the property owner was probably misled into making the
public benefit argument by the manner in which the case was required to be brought, which itself
was just a matter of historical happenstance. It was not until Mahon was decided in 1922, just
two months after Jackman, that the Court acknowledged the existence and possibility of a
"regulatory" taking. See note 60 and accompanying text. Thus, cases brought prior to Mahon,
such as Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., were typically phrased in terms of due process challenges. In
addition, Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. was decided in 1896, just before the Supreme Court's 1897
decision that the Fourteenth Amendment extended the Takings Clause to the states. See note 1.
Challenges to state legislation prior to the 1897 decision were also phrased in due process terms.
See, for example, Jackman, 260 U.S. at 29, in which the plaintiff argued that the legislation was
contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. at 158
(recognizing the claim that the citizen is deprived of his property without due process if land is
taken for other than public use); Head, 113 U.S. at 15 (deciding whether the plaintiff had been
deprived of his property without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment).
As a result, the phrasing of the claim in Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. was as inevitable as it was
misleading: Was "the citizen ... deprived of his property without due process of law, if it be
taken by or under state authority for any other purpose than a public use, either under the guise
of taxation or by the assumption of the right of eminent domainT 164 U.S. at 158.
256. See generally Stephen Diamond, The Death and Transfiguration of Benefit Taxation-
Special Assessments in Nineteenth-Century America, 12 J. Legal Stud. 201, 226-32 (1983)
(discussing evolution of special-assessment law). See Thomas M. Cooley, Taxation § 31 at 105-08
(Callaghan, 2d ed. 1886); John F. Dillon, 2 Commentaries on the Law of Municipal Corporations §
7612 (Little, Brown, 4th ed. 1890); Dean J. Misczynski, Special Assessments, in Donald G.
Hagman and Dean J. Misczynski, eds., Windfalls for Wipeouts: Land Value Capture and
Compensation 311 (Am. Society of Planning Officials, 1978), for summaries of turn-of-the-century
rules regarding special assessments.
257. See Diamond, Special Assessments at 201 (cited in note 256) ("[B]enefit taxes--of which
special-assessment taxes are the most'common form-attempt to apportion the cost of a
particular public improvement according to the benefit that the parties have received from it.").
258. See Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 278 (1898) (citing Mobile County v. Kimball, 102
U.S. 691, 703, 704 (1880); Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Decatur, 147 U.S. 190, 202 (1893);
Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 589 (1897)).
259. Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 706 (1884). See also Diamond,
Special Assessments at 209-10 & nn.34 & 35 (cited in note 256) (quoting the phrase "qui sentit
commodum sentire debet onus").
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reaping was done involuntarily or reluctantly.260 The Court's empha-
sis on the need for a public use reflected not only contemporaneous
understandings of the taxation power, specifically the power to impose
special assessments, but also notions regarding the distinction be-
tween taxation and confiscation. In the first edition of his constitu-
tional law treatise, for example, Judge Cooley clearly regarded public
use as a necessary component of a valid tax: "In the first place, taxa-
tion having for its legitimate object the raising of money for the public
purposes and proper needs of government, the exaction of moneys
from the citizens for other purposes is not a proper exercise of this
power, and must therefore be unauthorized.."261 'Unauthorized" taxes,
in his view, were "unlawful confiscation[s] of property, unwarranted
by a principle of constitutional government."262 The Court's initial
analysis in Fallbrook Irrigation District, with its heavy focus on public
use, seemed to suggest that the Court viewed the case as falling
within the special-assessment category.
The Fallbrook Irrigation District Court then went on to analo-
gize the irrigation act to an earlier common-scheme case involving the
reclamation of swamps-Hagar v. Reclamation District.2 63 The Court
apparently did not recognize that common-scheme cases were a dis-
tinct category, which would have made any comparison to them inap-
plicable and unnecessary if the irrigation act really fell into the class
of special assessments. The Fallbrook Irrigation District Court noted
that state statutes authorizing the drainage of swamps need not be
based on public health grounds, but instead the state may act through
"reasonable regulations for the general advantage of those who are
treated for this purpose as owners of a common property."26 The
Court explained:
260. Although precise calculation of the benefits and burdens was not required, see
Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. at 176, the Court viewed special assessments in excess of the
benefit conveyed to the burdened property owner as a taking. See Martin v. District of Columbia,
205 U.S. 135, 140 (1907) (finding that a state statute should be interpreted as limiting the
assessment to the amount of benefit conveyed, rather than permitting an assessment in excess of
the value of the property, so as to preserve the constitutionality of the statute).
261. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations at 479 (cited in note 22).
262. Id. See also Cole v. LeGrange, 113 U.S. 1, 6 (1884) ('The general grant of legislative
power in the Constitution of a State does not enable the legislature, in the exercise either of the
right of eminent domain, or of the right of taxation, to take private property, without the owner's
consent, for any but a public object.").
263. 111 U.S. 701, 705 (1884) (stating that the expense of swamp reclamation may be
"charged against parties specially benefitted ... according to the benefit received").
264. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. at 163 (citing Head, 113 U.S. at 22; Wurts, 114 U.S.
at 611; Cooley, Taxation at 617 (cited in note 256)).
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If it be essential or material for the prosperity of the community, and if the
improvement be one in which all the landowners have to a certain extent a
common interest, and the improvement cannot be accomplished without the
concurrence of all or nearly all of such owners by reason of the peculiar natural
condition of the tract sought to be reclaimed, then such reclamation may be
made and the land rendered useful to all and at their joint expense. In such
case the absolute right of each individual owner of land must yield to a certain
extent or be modified by corresponding rights on the part of other owners for
what is declared upon the whole to be for the public benefit.
26 5
The Court's explanation confused the notion of a common scheme,
which focuses on the private benefit inuring to a group of similarly
situated property owners, with special assessments, which necessarily
contain an element of public purpose and use as well as off-setting
benefits and burdens to particular landowners.266
The distinction between the two categories had been drawn
much more sharply and accurately in Wurts v. Hoagland, which was
the second of the three cases relied upon in Jackman, and which, like
Fallbrook Irrigation District, relied upon Head as precedent. The
state drainage statute "at issue in Wurts provided a procedure by
which marshland could be drained at the request of some of the own-
ers of the land, with the costs of the drainage operation to be charged
against all of the owners. 267 The complaining property owner's land
was drained against her wishes, and she was assessed the costs.
2
6
The Supreme Court rejected the property owner's claim that the
statute deprived her of property without due process of law, noting
that because "of the peculiar natural condition of the whole tract," no
portion of the tract could be improved without the improvement of all
portions.2 69 Even in the absence of a benefit to the public health or
welfare, the Wurts Court stated, the police power of the state necessar-
265. Id.
266. The Court ultimately seemed to base its decision on special-assessment grounds,
concluding that "we have no doubt that the irrigation of really arid lands is a public purpose, and
the water thus used is put to a public use." Id. at 164. The Court's confusion is even more
graphically illustrated by the three authorities that it cites in support of its common-scheme
argument: Head, which, as discussed in notes 237-50 and accompanying text, is really not a
common-scheme case, and Cooley's treatise on taxation, which addressed special assessments.
See Cooley, Taxation at 617 (cited in note 256) ('Mit may well be said that the public have such
an interest in the [drainage] improvement, and the consequent advancement of the general
interest of the locality, as will justify the levy of assessments upon the owners for drainage
purposes"). Only Wurts, discussed in notes 267-72 and the accompanying text, was a true
common-scheme case.
267. Wurts, 114 U.S. at 607.
268. Id. at 609-10.
269. Id. at 614.
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ily extends to regulations which result in the improvement of jointly
held lands at the joint expense of the property owners.2 70
To identify the basis of the legislature's power to pass legisla-
tion such as drainage statutes, the Wurts Court looked to the decisions
of several state cases. 271 These courts drew a distinction between
drainage and other improvement projects undertaken at the request of
some or all of the property owners for the primary benefit of the own-
ers, and improvements undertaken by the state to benefit primarily
the public, with incidental benefits flowing to affected property owners
in excess of the public benefit. The former category encompasses
common schemes, which may be undertaken by the state under the
police power and which do not give rise to compensation claims. The
latter encompasses projects for which special assessments against
property owners may be made under the state's taxing power, pro-
vided such assessments are limited to the benefits conveyed by the
project to those affected landowners.272
The third case cited in Jackman, Noble State Bank, was, like
Jackman itself, authored by Justice Holmes. In a short and rather
uninformative opinion, the Court upheld the constitutionality of an
Oklahoma statute which levied an assessment against each state
bank's average daily deposits for the purpose of creating a fund to
secure the repayment of deposits in the event of a bank's insolvency.273
The plaintiff bank, which contended that it was financially sound and
not in need of such a guarantee program, alleged the act resulted in a
taking of private property without just compensation because the
funds of a solvent bank would be taken to pay the debts of a failing
competitor.27 4 Justice Holmes, writing for a unanimous Court, noted
that although the act might at first glance seem to result in a taking of
private property to support a private interest (the shoring-up of failing
banks), the act served the greater public interest of preventing wide-
270. Id. at 614-15. See also id. at 611 ("It is the power of the government to prescribe public
regulations for the better and more economical management of property of persons whose
property adjoins, or which, from some other reason, can be better managed and improved by
some joint operation.... ") (citation omitted).
271. Wurts, 114 U.S. at 611-12 (citing State v. City of Newark, 3 Dutcher 185, 194 (N.J.
1858) (noting that drainage laws are exercises of police power and not taxing power); Coster v.
Tide Water Co., 3 C.E. Green 54, 58 (N.J. 1866); State v. Blake, 6 Vroom 208 (N.J. 1871) and 7
Vroom 442 (N.J. 1872)).
272. Id. at 611-14 (citations omitted).




spread bank failures and resultant public panic.25 Moreover, Justice
Holmes stated that in addition to the usual example of taxation, there
are other instances "in which the share of each party in the benefit of
a scheme of mutual protection is sufficient compensation for the cor-
relative burden that it is compelled to assume. '276 Although the spec-
ter of the average reciprocity of advantage rule is evident in Noble
State Bank, it is unclear whether the Court viewed this as a special-
assessment or common-scheme case.
What does this line of cases tell us, other than that the history
of the average reciprocity of advantage rule is muddled? First, the
differences between special assessments and common schemes are
striking in certain respects. Special assessments require the existence
of a public benefit and arise under the taxation power; common
schemes create essentially private benefits for the affected property
owners and arise under the police power. The distinction between the
common-scheme and special-assessment cases, however, while
important to a principled and clear articulation of the jurisprudential
development of the average reciprocity of advantage rule, in the final
analysis matters very little to the application of the rule and the
outcomes reached under it.
Second, the similarities between the two categories of govern-
ment acts are even more striking and are far more relevant to the
average reciprocity of advantage rule. In both instances, the evaluat-
ing court looks to see whether the burdened landowner is benefited by
the government act; if not, no special assessment may be made nor
may the property owner be forced into a common scheme.27 7 In each
instance, only a rough calculation of benefits conveyed is required.278
275. Id. at 112.
276. Id. at 111 (citing Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900)). As an alternative
ground, Justice Holmes stated that "an ulterior public advantage may justify a comparatively
insignificant taking of private property for what, in its immediate purpose, is a private use." Id.
at 110-11 (citations omitted). Ohio Oil was one of a group of cases in which the Supreme Court
established that restrictions on extractions from a common pool of natural resources are valid
when such restrictions serve to protect the rights of all common owners. See, for example, Walls
v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920) (upholding a statute prohibiting burning and
consumption of natural gas under certain circumstances); Lindley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co.,
220 U.S. 61 (1911) (upholding a statute that forbade a land owner from pumping water, gas, and
oil from his own land).
277. See Myles Salt Co. v. Iberia Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 478, 485 (1916) (stating that
formation of a special-assessment district "to include property which is not and cannot be
benefitted directly or indirectly ... is an abuse of power and an act of confiscation") (citing
Wagner v. Baltimore, 239 U.S. 207 (1915); Gast Realty Co. v. Schneider Granite Co., 240 U.S. 55
(1916); Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Road Improvement Dist. No. 6, 256 U.S. 658 (1920); Freund,
The Police Power § 442 (cited in note 15)).
278. See, for example, Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., 164 U.S. at 176 (noting that "the amount of
benefits is not susceptible of that accurate determination which appertains to a demonstration in
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Both categories of cases provide ample theoretical underpinnings for
the average reciprocity of advantage rule, for both encompass the
notion of balancing the benefits conveyed to and the burdens inflicted
upon regulated property owners.
At the most fundamental level, Jackman and its three precur-
sors each dealt with a situation in which a private property owner was
forced to participate with similarly situated property owners in a
common project initiated either by the state or by other property
owners. Although in all of these cases the property owners incurred a
burden in the form of restrictions on the use of their property and the
imposition of financial obligations, they also received offsetting
benefits in the form of assurance that all such similarly situated
owners would be required to act in a manner that would further the
interests of the entire group as a whole.27 9 It is this balancing of
reciprocal benefits and burdens that underlies the notion of "average
reciprocity of advantage" laid out in Jackman.
2. Mahon and Its Precursor, Plymouth Coal
Justice Holmes also referred to "average reciprocity of advan-
tage" in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,280 which was decided just
two months after Jackman was decided. In Mahon, as in Jackman,
Justice Holmes tossed out the phrase without explanation, using it to
distinguish the holding in Mahon from that in an earlier, seemingly
analogous case, Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania.281
geometry"); Hagar, 111 U.S. at 705 (stating that "absolute equality" in apportioning costs is not
required).
279. Nonetheless, these cases gave some early commentators pause. As one noted:
When a drain is built through private land it seems a stretch of language to say there has
not been a taking; but the explanation is that the whole swamp is treated as a unit and
as constituting in itself a single estate, although it is divided into separate parcels held
by different proprietors. Such a view prevailed when the constitutions were adopted and
the drainage statutes were then considered proper. It is now too late to raise literal
objections to their constitutionality. It is to be noted however that it would not be
possible, as an exercise of the branch of the police power in question, to take land for a
drain or dykes outside the limits of the tract which it was sought to improve, and this
power is consequently by no means as extensive as the power of eminent domain.
Nichols, 1 Eminent Domain § 88 at 241 (cited in note 234).
280. 260 U.S. at 415. See also notes 58-71 and accompanying text.
281. 232 U.S. 531 (1914). Interestingly, the discussion that would support the average
reciprocity of advantage rule came not from the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Plymouth Coal
but rather from an earlier holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.
In Mahon, Justice Holmes stated:
It is true that in Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania... it was held competent for the
legislature to require a pillar of coal to be left along the line of adjoining property, that,
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Plymouth Coal involved a challenge to a Pennsylvania statute,
the Anthracite Mine Laws, which required owners of adjoining coal
mines to leave in place pillars of coal along their property lines so as
to protect miners in the event the adjoining mine was abandoned and
allowed to fill with water.28 2 The statute was challenged by a mine
owner, who originally contended in state court that the statute de-
prived mine owners of a valuable property interest-the pillar of coal
left unmined-without providing them with just compensation as
required under the Constitution.s
The opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Plymouth
Coal is of little import. By the time the case reached the Court, the
mine owner had conceded that the requirement of leaving a pillar in
place was a valid exercise of the police power; rather, at this stage, it
contended solely that the statutory method for calculating the width of
the pillar was "so crude, uncertain, and unjust" that it resulted in a
taking of private property without due process of law24--an argument
which the Court had little difficulty rejecting.2s5
with the pillar on the other side of the line, would be a barrier sufficient for the safety of
the employees of either mine in case the other should be abandoned and allowed to fill
with water. But that was a requirement for the safety of employees invited into the
mine, and secured an average reciprocity of advantage that has been recognized as a
justification of various laws.
Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415. Justice Holmes's private correspondence indicates that he did not
regard average reciprocity of advantage as key to the decision reached in Mahon. See, for
example, Mark D. Howe, 2 Holmes-Pollock Letters-The Correspondence of Mr. Justice Holmes
and Sir Frederick Pollock, 1874-1932, at 109 (Belknap, 1941), where Justice Holmes wrote:
"Brandeis's dissent speaks as if what I call average reciprocity of advantage were made the
general ground by me. Not so. I use that only to explain a particular case." Rather, Justice
Holmes went on to state: "My ground is that the public only got on to this land by paying for it
and that if they saw fit to pay only for a surface right they can't enlarge it because they need it
now anymore than they could have taken the right of being there in the first place." Id. See also
Howe, 1 Letters at 462 (cited in note 70) ("If you read.the document you will see that I do not, as
[Brandeis] suggests, rely upon average reciprocity of advantage as a general ground, but only to
explain a certain class of cases.").
282. Plymouth Coal, 232 U.S. at 539.
283. Pennsylvania v. Plymouth Coal Co., 81 A. 148, 149 (Penn. 1911). The volume of coal af-
fected by the statute was substantial. As Professor Fischel, who investigated the history of the
coal industry in examining the background of Mahon and Plymouth Coal, noted: "Don't think of
Greek temples; the volume of pillars was about a third of the coal in the vein" Fischel,
Regulatory Takings at 19 (cited in note 167).
284. Plymouth Coal, 232 U.S. at 540.
285. The Court noted:
The objections of plaintiff in error to the method of fixing the width of the barrier pillar
are based upon the supposed uncertainty and want of uniformity in the membership of
the statutory tribunal, and upon the fact that the statute does not expressly provide for
notice to the parties interested, that the procedure is not prescribed, and that there is no
right of appeal.
Id. at 542. The Court rejected each claim. See id. at 542-44 (finding no problem with the
membership of the tribunal); id. at 544 (finding the giving of notice implied within the statutory
1502
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The opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, on the other
hand, actually addressed the average reciprocity of advantage concept,
although the court did not use that precise phrase. The state supreme
court acknowledged that while the statute protected the mine owners'
property by preventing flooding by adjoining mines, such property
protection was only "incidental[ ]" to the primary purposes of the
statute,28 which were protection of the miners' lives and protection of
neighboring property owners' rights2 7 The court emphasized, how-
ever, that the police power would permit the regulation of private
property where necessary to prevent the use of property from intrud-
ing upon the rights of othersm and would permit the utter destruction
of private property if needed to promote the public safety, morals,
health, or general welfare.2 9 The court set forth two alternative
explanations for why no compensation was required in either case.
First, the lack of compensation may be the result of the loss being
regarded as damnum absque injuria (a loss without an injury)-an
argument generally used for injury considered to be so "remote and
consequential" that it must "be bourne as a part of the price to be paid
for the advantages of the social condition."29° Alternatively, monetary
compensation may not be required because the owner may be
"sufficiently compensated by sharing in the general (and, in this case,
also the specific) benefits" flowing from the police power act-in effect,
by a balancing of reciprocal benefits and burdens.2 91 In this instance,
each mine owner was burdened by the requirement that it leave
untouched a ribbon of its coal, but it was benefited by a similar
requirement being imposed upon its adjoining mine owners. 292
language); id. at 545-46 (finding that it must be presumed that the tribunal would not interfere
with the plaintiffs constitutional rights unless evidence to the contrary appears); id. at 547
(finding the right of appeal is discretionary with the legislature).
286. Plymouth Coal, 81 A. at 152.
287. Id. at 149-51.
288. Id. at 151 (quoting the maxim "sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas").
289. Id.
290. Lansing v. Smith, 8 Cow. 146, 149 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1828).
As the California Supreme Court explained:
[Djamnum absque injuria... means merely that a person may suffer damages and be
without remedy because no legal right or right established by law and possessed by him
has been invaded, or the person causing the damage owes no duty known to the law to re-
frain from doing the act causing the damage.
Rose v. State, 19 Cal.2d 713, 123 P.2d 505, 515 (1942).
291. Plymouth Coal, 81 A. at 151 (citing 22 Am. & Eng. Encyclopedia of Law 916 (2d ed..
1897)).
292. The court stated:
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Mahon involved a slightly different set of facts than Plymouth
Coal. In Mahon, the state legislature had enacted the Kohler Act,
which required mine owners to leave in place pillars of coal to prevent
subsidence of overlying structures. The legal problem arose because
the mine owners had, in this and other instances, specifically reserved
the right to remove all of the coal and had specifically passed to the
surface owner the risk that subsidence might occur as a result of that
removal.293 The statute "admitted[ly]" destroyed existing contract and
property interests; "[t]he question," as Justice Holmes put it, was
"whether the police power can be stretched so far" as to justify such
destruction in the absence of compensation.294
The Court held that the Kohler Act did effect a taking, for it
found that the police power could not justify such a restriction on a
property owner's right to make beneficial use of its property. The
damage was not considered "common or public,"295 even though similar
damage was inflicted upon other houses and structures in other
locations. Nor did the Court find that the regulation could be justified
in terms of promoting public safety for, in its view, that objective could
be ensured by merely giving notice to the surface owner that the mine
owner intended to mine under the house or structure (presumably so
that the occupants could vacate the premises prior to collapse)-and
indeed, the Act required the giving of exactly such notice. 96
Justice Holmes distinguished Mahon from the Court's opinion
in Plymouth Coal. Although Plymouth Coal, like Mahon, involved a
state statute requiring that pillars of coal be left in place, in Plymouth
Coal the requirement was imposed "for the safety of employees invited
into the mine, and secured an average reciprocity of advantage that
has been recognized as a justification of various laws."297 Mahon, on
the other hand, involved an allocation of the risk of subsidence be-
This rib of solid coal not to be mined into by either of the adjoining owners was to be
contributed by each in equal parts for the mutual benefit of each.... This regulation
works no hardship on one for the benefit of another, but is impartial, just, and
reasonable, imposing a common burden for the benefit of all such owners.
Id. (citation omitted).
293. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 412 ("The deed conveys the surface, but in express terms reserves
the right to remove all the coal under the same, and the grantee takes the premises with the
risk, and waives all claim for damages that may arise from mining out the coal').
294. Id. at 413.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 414. The effectiveness of the notice requirement is another issue. As Professor
Fischel noted, the fact that deaths and property damage occurred as a result of subsidence
undercuts Holmes's suggestion that notice alone was enough to provide for public safety. Fischel,
Regulatory Takings at 26 (cited in note 167).
297. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414.
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tween the surface and subsurface owners of property. Although the
state could exercise its eminent domain power to eliminate the risk of
subsidence, it could not attempt to do so indirectly and without com-
pensation through the exercise of the police power.
298
Ironically, Justice Brandeis's dissent in Mahon focused more
directly on the average reciprocity of advantage rule than did Justice
Holmes's majority opinion.299 Justice Brandeis contended that a regu-
lation that prevented subsidence of surface structures was clearly
justifiable as an exercise of the police power.30° He criticized the
majority holding as seeming to conclude that this type of police power
action could rest only upon an "average reciprocity of advantage"
between the regulated property owner and the rest of the community,
a reciprocity that the majority found lacking in the instant case.301
Rather, he argued that the harm/benefit test provides a separate
justification for such acts. Justice Brandeis drew the correct and
necessary distinction between police power acts based in the
harm/benefit test and police power acts based in the average
reciprocity of advantage rule:
Reciprocity of advantage is an important consideration, and may even be an
essential, where the State's power is exercised for the purpose of conferring
benefits upon the property of a neighborhood, as in drainage projects, or upon
adjoining owners, as by party wall provisions. But where the police power is
exercised, not to confer benefits upon property owners, but to protect the public
from detriment and danger, there is, in my opinion, no room for considering
reciprocity of advantage.30
2
Where Justice Brandeis went astray was in finding that the
state's interest in preventing the harm that would ensue from subsi-
dence justified the regulation, despite the parties' explicit contractual
allocation of that risk. Justice Brandeis's overly facile dismissal of the
contractual agreement reached by the parties would have been of little
298. Id. at 416. The Court stated:
We assume, of course, that the statute was passed upon the conviction that an exigency
existed that would warrant it, and we assume that an exigency exists that would warrant
the exercise of eminent domain. But the question at bottom is upon whom the loss of the
changes desired should fall. So far as private persons or communities have seen fit to
take the risk of acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that their risk
has become a danger warrants the giving to them greater rights than they have bought.
Id.
299. Id. at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. (citing Wurts, Fallbrook Irrigation Dist., and Jackman).
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import had he not followed it up by stating that in other instances
where a contested regulation was upheld as preventing harm, no
reciprocal advantage was present, "unless it be the advantage of living
and doing business in a civilized community,"303 an advantage that
Justice Brandeis concluded, was "given by the [Kohler Act] to the coal
operators."304 This gratuitous comment by Justice Brandeis regarding
the societal aspects of the reciprocal benefits of harm-preventing
regulations provided fodder for Justice Brennan half a century later,305
when he constructed the "social reciprocity" version of average reci-
procity of advantage-the view that appears to predominate today and
the one that distorts modern application of the rule.3°6
3. Reciprocity and Zoning
The second setting in which the notion of "average reciprocity
of advantage" found early application involved comprehensive zoning
schemes. The average reciprocity of advantage rule should have
reached its fullest flowering in this arena, yet the Supreme Court has
virtually ignored the rule in this context. During the very early years
of the twentieth century, communities increasingly turned to compre-
hensive zoning schemes as a mechanism for controlling industrial
growth and the pressures of economic development.30 7 The concept of
zoning was new and hotly debated in the legal literature308 and even
more hotly contested in the courts. Although some early courts struck
down comprehensive zoning schemes,09 other courts upheld them,
310
303. Id. (citations omitted).
304. Id.
305. See notes 343-45 and accompanying text (discussing Brennan's treatment of Brandeis's
dissent inAndrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979)).
306. See notes 401-02 and accompanying text (discussing effects of Brennan's test).
307. See note 202 and accompanying text (citing Euclid for the proposition that notions of
legitimate land use and regulation thereof necessarily change over time as populations increase
and perceptions of appropriate land use change). See also Robert C. Ellickson and A. Dan
Tarlock, Land Use Controls: Cases and Materials 39-41 (Little, Brown, 1981) (discussing rapid
spread of zoning ordinances and zoning enabling acts in 1920s and 1930s); Scott M. Reznick,
Comment, Land Use Regulation and the Concept of Takings in Nineteenth Century America, 40
U. Chi. L. Rev. 854, 858-66 (1973) (discussing effects of urbanization on use of police power).
308. A list of the contemporary legal scholarship is provided in Thomas Reed Powell, The
Supreme Court and State Police Power, 1922-1930 - IV, 18 Va. L. Rev. 1, 18-21 nn.37-40 (1931).
309. See, for example, Goldman v. Crowther, 128 A. 50, 60 (Md. Ct. App. 1925) (invalidating
a zoning scheme which imposed arbitrary restrictions without logical relation to the public
welfare); City of St. Louis v. Evraiff, 256 S.W. 489, 495 (Mo. 1923) (striking down an ordinance
which prohibited the erection or use of property for the storage of scrap iron, rags, and junk in
industrial districts, and permitted such use in unrestricted districts); Ignaciunas v. Risley, 121 A.
783, 786 (N.J. 1923) (striking down a law which invoked the police power to ban a store in a
residential section because it might render the highway more dangerous); Handy v. Village of S.
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often finding that such schemes fostered what was essentially average
reciprocity of advantage among those regulated, though the courts did
not use that precise term.3 1 1
The Supreme Court resolved any lingering questions regarding
the constitutionality of comprehensive zoning schemes in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.312 Euclid passed a zoning ordinance which
divided the entire village into various use, height, and area districts.31 3
The complaining property owner owned sixty-eight acres of land, all of
which had been zoned for various types of residential uses. The
property owner contended that its land was suited only for commercial
and industrial purposes and that the ordinance thus "confiscate[d] and
destroy[ed] a great part" of the value of its land.3 4
The district court in Euclid agreed with the property owner,
expressly rejecting the average reciprocity of advantage rule as a
justification for the ordinance.3 5 The district court stated that the
burden inflicted upon the property owner by the regulation was not
offset by any benefit that the owner received from similar burdens
being inflicted upon other property owners within the village.316
Rather, the district court found that the decline in property values suf-
Orange, 118 A. 838, 839 (N.J. 1922) (overturning an ordinance which forbade the building of two-
family houses in the entire village).
310. See, for example, Boland v. Compagno, 97 S. 661 (La. 1923) (upholding an ordinance
which prohibited the establishment of any business on a particular street except for drug stores,
boarding houses, apartment houses, hotels, and banks); State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 196 N.W.
451, 453-55 (Wis. 1923) (upholding a law forbidding a dairy and milk pasteurizing plant in a
Milwaukee district); Cliffside Park Realty Co. v. Borough of Cliffside, 114 A. 797, 797 (N.J. 1921)
(upholding a restriction on land uses not forbidden by "regulation controlling business districts");
Cochran v. Preston, 70 A. 113, 114-15 (Md. 1908) (upholding a law providing that, except for
churches, no building over a certain height could be erected in a certain area of Baltimore);
Lincoln Trust Co. v. Williams Bldg. Corp., 128 N.E. 209, 210-11 (N.Y. 1920) (upholding a
resolution regulating the height and bulk of certain buildings in New York City); Ware v. City of
Wichita, 214 P. 99, 102 (Kan. 1923) (upholding a law which prohibited the construction of a
business building in a residential area); Watertown v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315, 318 (1872)
(upholding a law which prevented the use of a building for the purpose of slaughtering sheep,
cattle, or other animals without prior consent of the mayor or selectmen).
1 311. See, for example, State ex rel. Carter v. Harper, 196 N.W. at 453 (stating that the owner
"who is limited in the use of his property finds compensation therefor in the benefits accruing to
him from the like limitations imposed upon his neighbor"); Cochran, 70 A. at 114-15 (discussing
ordinance that involved the reciprocal benefit and protection of other owners of the buildings
within the specified area).
312. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 365. See notes 72-78 and accompanying text (discussing Euclid).
313. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 380.
314. Id. at 384.




fered by the plaintiff and similarly situated property owners would
simply be transferred to property owners in unrestricted industrial
areas, either nearby or far away.317  The court saw a distinction be-
tween ordinances regulating party walls, as in Jackman, or boundary
pillars of coal, as in Plymouth Coal, where benefits are reciprocal,
"even though unequal in individual cases,"31s and the instant case, in
which "the property values [were] either dissipated or transferred to
unknown and more or less distant owners."' 19 Although the court
noted that some of the restrictions of the ordinance might be valid as
applied to either the plaintiffs property or to other properties in the
village, it found that the invalid portions of the ordinance were so
"intermingled and inseparable" that the entire ordinance must be
nullified32o
The United States Supreme Court reversed the district court's
opinion and held that the comprehensive zoning ordinance was a
legitimate exercise of the police power. 32' Interestingly, Justice
Sutherland, writing for the majority in a 6-3 decision, did not refer to
"average reciprocity of advantage" in doing so, although he talked
extensively in general terms about the benefits accruing to the public
as a whole from categorizing land into residential and industrial
uses, 322 and the benefits accruing to the occupants of single-family
residential districts from segregating single-family and multi-family
residential uses. 323
Instead of focusing directly on these benefit-conferring charac-
teristics of the zoning ordinance, the Euclid Court described the ordi-
nance as a legitimate extension of the village's police power authority
317. Id. at 316.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 317.
321. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 397.
322. Id. at 391. Justice Sutherland stated that such categorization results in:
promotion of the health and security from injury of children and others by separating
dwelling houses from territory devoted to trade and industry; suppression and prevention
of disorder; facilitating the extinguishing of fires, and the enforcement of street traffic
regulations and other general welfare ordinances; aiding the health and safety of the
community by excluding from residential areas the confusion and danger of fire,
contagion and disorder which in greater or less degree attach to the location of stores,
shops and factories.
Id. He added as final reasons the reduced street construction and repair costs engendered by
"confining the greater part of the heavy traffic to the streets where business is carried on." Id.
323. Id. at 394, 395 (stating that "very often the apartment house is a mere parasite, con-
structed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive surroundings created by
the residential character of the district" and that where multi-family uses concentrate in a
single-family area, "apartment houses, which in a different environment would be not only en-
tirely unobjectionable but highly desirable, come very near to being nuisances").
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to regulate nuisances, in effect placing the ordinance squarely under
the harm/benefit test. 24 Although the Euclid Court was careful not to
equate the scope of the police power with the power to regulate nui-
sances, 325 it nonetheless failed to recognize expressly the key diver-
gence between the police power and the nuisance-regulation power in
the zoning context. A more complete articulation and analysis of the
legitimacy of zoning ordinances in general would have been based not
solely upon the state's ability to regulate land uses so as to prevent
public nuisances, but would have also explicitly acknowledged that
some such regulations are designed to increase property values by
affording protection to similarly situated property owners by providing
reciprocal benefits through land use regulation. Indeed, contemporary
scholars had explicitly discussed the reciprocal benefits that flow to
similarly situated property owners through a zoning ordinance, noting
that such regulations may well protect and increase the value of all
property regulated under them.3 26 Similarly, in the decades before
Euclid was decided, a number of state courts had recognized the mu-
tual benefits and burdens flowing to property owners as a result of
zoning regulations 327 and had acknowledged that the benefits need not
324. Id. at 387-88.
325. Euclid, 272 U.S. at 387-88 (noting that 'the law of nuisances ... may be consulted, not
for the purpose of controlling, but for the helpful aid of its analogies in the process of ascertaining
the scope of, the [police] power").
326. See, for example, Newman F. Baker, Zoning Legislation, 11 Cornell L.Q. 164, 168-69
(1926) ("But, though zoning regulations are imposed under the police power and restrict the
owner in the use of his property, it does not follow that the adjustment of rights between
property owners takes rights without conferring them. Often zoning increases the value of the
property concerned"); Bettman, 37 Harv. L. Rev. at 839 (cited in note 80) (noting that under
zoning, "each piece of property pays, in the form of reasonable regulation of its use, for the
protection which the plan gives to all property lying within the boundaries of the plan"); J.S.
Young, City Planning and Restrictions on the Use of Property, 9 Minn. L. Rev. 593, 602-04 (1925)
(noting that the use of the police power for zoning is analogous to "drainage, irrigation, and
compulsory joint improvements" and quoting Freund, Nichols, and Fallbrook Irrigation Dist.).
327. See, for example, Cochran, 70 A. at 114-15 (holding that a zoning regulation "in its very
purpose involves the reciprocal benefit and protection" of regulated property owners); Watertown
v. Mayo, 109 Mass. 315, 318 (1872) (stating that the regulated property owner "is presumed to be
rewarded by the common benefits secured"); Piper v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 194 N.W. 159, 161
(1923). In Piper, the court stated:
Such regulation affecting the owners of property in a certain area, to a large extent, is
founded upon the mutual and reciprocal protection which owners of property derive from
a general law, and, while in a sense a material diminution in value may result,
nevertheless a reciprocal advantage accrues which in many instances it is impossible to
estimate from a financial standpoint, but which nevertheless constitutes a thing of value
and a compensating factor for the interference by the public with property rights.
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be monetarily quantifiable or necessarily equal to the burdens
imposed.
28
Certainly, not all zoning ordinances can be validated in terms
of average reciprocity of advantage. Some zoning restrictions, such as
those that prohibit noisy or dangerous industrial or commercial uses
in residential neighborhoods, are more properly grounded in the
state's nuisance-prevention power. However, other types of zoning
provisions, such as height or minimum-yard regulations, confer bene-
fits upon similarly situated property owners by holding each of them
to a uniform standard. Although each property owner may find use of
his or her land restricted by the regulation, each is benefited by hav-
ing similar burdens imposed upon his or her neighbors. Thus, al-
though a property owner might be limited to a residential use, he or
she is secure in the knowledge that neighboring properties are also so
limited, and that a factory will not be erected in the midst of the resi-
dential area, where it would greatly diminish the value of his or her
residential property. A full discussion of this benefit-conferring aspect
of zoning ordinances by the Euclid Court might have prevented the
average reciprocity of advantage rule from being so distorted by the
Supreme Court in its modern cases.
B. Modern Application of the Rule: Penn Central and Its Successors
After Mahon, the Court did not refer to the average reciprocity
of advantage rule again for fifty years. Although the concept of recip-
rocal benefits and burdens continued to arise sporadically in the
courts, it typically did so in the context of comprehensive zoning regu-
lations, where the doctrine was used to emphasize the reciprocal
benefits and burdens that flowed from such regulations and to explain
why such regulations were constitutional even though unaccompanied
by payment of just compensation.329
Id.
328. See, for example, State ex rel. Carter, 182 Wis. 148, 196 N.W. at 453 (upholding a law
forbidding a dairy and milk pasteurizing plant in a district in Milwaukee).
329. See, for example, HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 15 Cal. 3d 508,
542 P.2d 237, 246 (1975):
In this case, as in most instances, zoning is not an arbitrary action depriving someone of
property for the purpose of its use by the public or transfer to another; rather it involves
reciprocal benefits and burdens which the circumstances of this case well illustrate. The
shopping center which plaintiffs seem at various times to have contemplated erecting,
would derive its value from the existence of residential housing in the surrounding area.
That residential character of the neighborhood, we may assume, results in part from the
residential zoning of the area around the tract in question. Plaintiffs in this case
therefore find themselves in a somewhat uncomfortable position: they wish to reap the
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When the Court finally returned to this topic in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. New York City,330 decided in 1978, the Court set
forth the modern form of the average reciprocity of advantage rule,
which essentially rejected the limitations established by the original
articulations of the rule. Penn Central involved a challenge to New
York City's Landmark Preservation Law brought by the *owners of
Penn Central Terminal, a designated historic landmark. The owners
applied to the Landmark Preservation Commission to lease to a third
party the right to construct a multi-story office tower above the
Terminal; the Landmark Preservation Commission denied their
petition for use.33'
At issue was a landmark preservation regulation which sought
to preserve over 400 designated landmarks (of which Penn Central
Terminal was one) in addition to thirty-one historic districts.33 2 The
property owners alleged, among other things,333 that the regulation
effected a taking because it failed to impose similar restrictions upon
all structures located in specific areas; thus, they argued, the
regulation failed to create the "fair and equitable distribution of
benefits and burdens of governmental action" that typified the zoning
ordinances and historic-district regulation that had passed
constitutional muster in the past.3m The property owners contended
that they were "solely burdened and unbenefited" by the regulation.3 35
In effect, the owners were alleging that the landmark regulation failed
to achieve an average reciprocity of advantage.
Justice Brennan, writing for a 6-3 majority, rejected this argu-
ment. Although his opinion did not use the phrase "average reciproc-
ity of advantage,"336 the presence of the doctrine is implicit. He noted
that "[l]egislation designed to promote the general welfare commonly
benefit in the form of higher market values of their land, of the restrictive zoning on
other properties, but do not wish to bear the reciprocal burden of such zoning when it
applies to their property.
330. 438 U.S. at 104. See notes 90-100 and accompanying text (discussing Penn Central and
the nuisance exception to the harm/benefit test).
331. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116-17.
332. Id. at 132 n.28.
333. The owners alleged the regulation effected a taking without just compensation in
violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and deprived them of due process in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 119.
334. Id. at 133.
335. Id. at 134.
336. However, Justice Rehnquist did in his dissent. See id. at 147 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (discussed in notes 373-81 and accompanying text).
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burdens some more than others."'3 37 Justice Brennan pointed to the
examples of Hadacheck, Miller, and Goldblatt,38 noting that the
owners in those cases suffered disproportionately from the legislation
restricting their land uses. He rejected the contention of the
Terminars owners that those cases dealt with noxious uses, stating
that the cases involved lawful, nonblameworthy uses and that the
restrictions at issue in each case were designed to implement a public
policy "expected to produce a widespread public benefit and applicable
to all similarly situated property.' '339
Moreover, Justice Brennan declared that where a land use
regulation benefits society as a whole, the regulated land owner, as a
member of society, is also benefited.m° According to Justice Brennan,
this indirect benefit, even in the absence of a direct benefit to the
landowner in his or her status as a regulated party and even though
the owner might feel "more burdened than benefited by the law,"
341 is
sufficient to support the exercise of the police power, provided that the
benefits to society outweigh the burdens to the landowner. In short,
as long as the burdened property owner receives gross benefits equal
to those received by every other member of the community, average
reciprocity of advantage is achieved.
Justice Brennan returned to this theme of societal benefit in
Andrus v. Allard,342 decided just eighteen months after Penn Central.
In Andrus, the Court upheld a regulation which severely limited the
uses to which legally obtained feathers of eagles and certain other
protected species of birds could be put and which prohibited outright
the sale of such items. Justice Brennan, writing for a unanimous
Court, quoted from Justice Brandeis's dissent in Mahon, stating that
regulated property owners could not complain of a "burden borne to
secure the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized com-
munity."343 Justice Brennan's suggestion that the "social" reciprocity
created by regulations was sufficient to prevent a taking was a bas-
tardization of what Justice Brandeis actually meant. Justice Brandeis
337. Id. at 133.
338. See notes 137-43 and accompanying text (discussing Miller) and 148-51 (discussing
Hadacheck and Goldblatt).
339.- Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133 n.30.
340. Id. at 134-35 (stating that unless the Court were to reject the New York City Council's
judgment that "the preservation of landmarks benefits all New York citizens and all structures,
both economically and by improving the quality of life in the city as a whole," which the Court
was unwilling to do, the Court could not "conclude that the owners of the Terminal have in no
sense been benefited by the Landmarks Law").
341. Id. at 135.
342. 444 U.S. 51 (1979).
343. Id. at 67 (quoting Mahon, 260 U.S. at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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had argued in Mahon that while reciprocity of advantage was impor-
tant and perhaps even essential when the state exercised its police
power for the purpose of conveying benefits to property owners, no
reciprocity was necessary where the police power was used to prevent
the infliction of a harm upon the public.344 Justice Brandeis cited
several cases in which police power acts had been upheld because of
their harm-preventing nature, and noted that in each instance, the
owner had received no reciprocal benefit, unless the benefit was that
of simply belonging to a society in which harms to the public were not
tolerated.145 Justice Brandeis's clear intent was to dismiss reciprocal
benefits as a necessary component of harm-preventing regulation.
Nothing in his opinion indicated that he intended to imply that gener-
alized benefits to society as a whole were sufficient to offset the bur-
dens inflicted upon a particular property owner as a result of a police
power action that conveyed benefits but did not prevent harms.
Justice Brennan took his third bite at the social reciprocity
apple in his dissent in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,
346
decided in 1987. The Nollan Court held, in a 5-4 decision, that a state
requirement that conditioned issuance of a building permit for an
oceanfront house on the property owners' agreeing to grant an ease-
ment to the public to traverse their beach was a regulatory taking
because the condition did not serve any public purpose related to the
permit requirement. 347 Justice Brennan dissented. Among the argu-
ments he raised was that of average reciprocity of advantage. Justice
Brennan applied the three-part test of Penn Central34s and found that
the economic impact of this regulation did not rise to the level of a
taking. Rather, he found that conditioning the issuance of the permit
upon the property owners' granting public access was "a classic in-
stance of government action that produces a 'reciprocity of advan-
tage.' ,349 First, he argued, the permit would enable the property own-
ers to greatly expand the size of the house on their lot, thus increasing
the parcel's value.3 50 In effect, he was arguing that the property own-
344. See notes 299-304 and accompanying text (discussing Brandeis's dissent in Mahon).
345. Mahon, 260 U.S. at 422 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
346. 483 U.S. at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See notes 214-17 and accompanying text for
a discussion of Nollan in the context of the harm/benefit test.
347. 483 U.S. at 838-42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
348. See text accompanying note 9 for the Court's statement of the Penn Central test.
349. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 856 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415).
350. Id. Justice Brennan noted: "[A]ppellants make no contention that this increase is
offset by any diminution in value resulting from the deed restriction, much less that the
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ers were receiving a benefit (permission to build a house bigger than
their existing one) that offset the burden that the regulation inflicted
upon them (permitting public access to their beach).351 Second, Justice
Brennan contended that the regulation actually benefited the property
owners "both as private landowners and as members of the public"
because they were able to walk along other people's beaches as a
result of other beachfront owners being required to grant similar
lateral easements.3
52
The flaw in Justice Brennan's reasoning is two-fold. First,
permitting the landowners to develop their own property, a use to
which they were already entitled, can hardly be termed a benefit that
offsets any loss incurred as a result of the regulation. Unless it can be
shown that the state had a legitimate reason for limiting the size of
the house on the lot to that of the existing structure, the regulation
must fail.
Second, average reciprocity of advantage would occur only if
the only persons allowed access to the property owner's beach were
similarly situated oceanfront owners who had also been required to
grant access in the same manner. In Nollan, however, the regulation
was intended to grant access to the general public, even though the
public had paid nothing for that privilege. Therefore, a class of per-
sons (beachfront owners) was required to bear a burden (forced grant-
ing of access to their private beaches) in order that the public as a
whole might benefit. The mere fact that the beachfront owners them-
selves also benefited from the regulation is not enough to wipe out the
disproportionate burden that the regulation inflicted upon them.
The expansive social view of average reciprocity of advantage
that Justice Brennan articulated in Penn Central, Andrus, and Nollan
was echoed by other Justices in other opinions. In the 1980 decision
in Agins v. Tiburon, for example, Justice Powell, writing for a
unanimous Court, determined that a zoning ordinance that reduced
the permitted density on the appellants' land in order to promote open
space and minimize urbanization did not, on its face, effect a taking.353
Justice Powell found a legitimate state'interest in encouraging provi-
sion of open space and discouraging high-density development of
restriction made the property less valuable than it would have been without the new
construction." Id.
351. Of course, this analysis works only if one accepts the premise that the state can unilat-
erally and without reason restrict the size of any residence.
352. Id.
353. 447 U.S. at 255.
1514 [Vol. 50:1449
TAKINGS ANALYSIS
urban lands.354 Although he noted that the ordinance limited the
development potential (and hence the value) of appellants' land, he
argued that the ordinance benefited not only the public, but also the
appellants and similarly situated property owners, by providing for
"careful and orderly development of residential property with provi-
sion for open-space areas. 355 In evaluating the constitutionality of the
zoning ordinances, Justice Powell stressed that these "benefits" to the
regulated property owners must be balanced against the "burdens"
inflicted upon them by the zoning ordinance.
3 56
Similarly, in Hodel v. Irving,57 Justice O'Connor, writing for
the Court, found that the generalized benefit to an Indian tribe as a
whole flowing from a federal statute providing for escheat of certain
property interests in Indian lands outweighed the burden that the
statute imposed on the individual property owners. Over time, indi-
vidual ownership of formerly communal lands had resulted in highly
fractionalized parcels. Congress enacted the Indian Land
Consolidation Act of 1983, which provided for escheat of certain lands
to the tribe and which prohibited descent of those lands by intestacy
or devise. The legislation did not provide for any compensation to
disappointed heirs or devisees. Although the Court ultimately struck
down the legislation on the grounds that the American legal system
would not permit the "total abrogration" of inheritance rights,
358
Justice O'Connor noted in dicta that one factor "weighing weakly" in
the statute's favor was the existence of an "average reciprocity of
advantage. 359 Justice O'Connor reasoned that consolidation of tribal
lands benefited the members of the tribe. While not all tribal mem-
bers owned escheatable lands, nor were all owners of escheatable
lands members of the tribe, the overlap between the two categories
was "substantial."36 Although owners of escheatable lands were bur-
dened by the statute, insofar as they were members of the tribe they
also benefited by the escheat of the fractional interests of others.
More telling, Justice O'Connor noted that the whole benefit gained by
the regulation (the consolidation of lands) was greater than the sum of
354. Id. at 261.
355. Id. at 262.
356. Id. The Court did not use the phrase "average reciprocity of advantage" in reaching
this outcome.
357. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
358. Id. at 716.




the burdens imposed upon the individual property owners "since
consolidated lands are more productive than fractionated lands."' 1
The benefit to the tribe as a whole, therefore, was balanced against
the burden to the property owner as an individual, rather than the
benefits to the individual property owner being balanced against the
burdens borne by that same individual.
Likewise, in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v.
DeBenedictis, Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in a 5-4 deci-
sion, declared that not only may the benefit accrue to society as a
whole, but that it need not even necessarily flow from the specific
regulation at issue.362 Rather, it may simply arise from the land use
regulation scheme as a whole. As noted above,363 Keystone involved a
factual pattern remarkably similar to that of Mahon. The plaintiff
mine owners challenged the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania
Bituminous Mine Subsidence and Land Conservation Act, which re-
quired that fifty percent of the coal beieath certain structures be left
in place in order to prevent subsidence. 3 4
The Keystone Court distinguished Mahon, finding that the
statute at issue in Keystone had been passed to serve important public
interests ("health, the environment, and the fiscal integrity of the
area"365), while the statute at issue in Mahon had been enacted to
benefit private parties (by protecting against damage to the homes of
landowners who had contractually assumed the risk of such dam-
age).366 Justice Stevens adopted the two-part takings test first articu-
lated in Agins v. Tiburon, where the Court had held that a land use
regulation effects a taking if it "does not substantially advance legiti-
mate state interests.., or denies an owner economically viable use of
his land."367 Justice Stevens apparently viewed the average reciprocity
of advantage rule as a subset of the first part of the Agins test. He
argued that the Court's hesitancy to find a taking where a regulation
merely restrains uses of property "that are tantamount to public nui-
sances" simply reflected Justice Holmes's average reciprocity of advan-
tage theory: "While each of us is burdened somewhat by such restric-
tions, we, in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed
361. Id. at 716.
362. "480 U.S. at 470.
363. See text accompanying notes 101-02 (discussing factual similarities between Keystone
and Mahon).
364. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 476-77.
365. Id. at 488.
366. Id. at 486.
367. 447 U.S. at 260 (citations omitted).
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on others."368 Justice Stevens thus seemed to equate the harm/benefit
test and the average reciprocity of advantage rule.369 He noted that
the state, in order to protect the public welfare, must be able to re-
strict the use of private property.370 He saw the reciprocity involved
not as specific to the individual situation, but rather as generalized to
society as a whole,371 and he explicitly stated that the Takings Clause
did not require a one-to-one equivalency between the burden inflicted
upon and the benefit received by each individual property owner.372
Justice Rehnquist, on the other hand, rejected this "social
reciprocity" vision of the average reciprocity of advantage rule on two
occasions. He dissented in Penn Central, basing his dissent in large
part upon the lack of reciprocity in benefits and burdens afforded by
the Landmark Law.373 A typical zoning ordinance may restrict the
uses of property and in so doing may diminish the value of that prop-
erty, but that diminution is generally at least in part offset by an
increase in value that stems from similar restrictions being put upon
neighboring properties.3 74 The reciprocal restrictions operate not only
for the benefit of the community as a whole (as Justice Brennan had
368. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491.
369. Justice Stevens stated: "The Court's hesitance to find a taking when the State merely
restrains uses of property that are tantamount to public nuisances is consistent with the notion
of'reciprocity of advantage' that Justice Holmes referred to in Pennsylvania Coal." Id. He went
on to state:
The special status of this type of state action can also be understood on the simple theory
that since no individual has a right to use his property so as to create a nuisance or
otherwise harm others, the State has not 'taken' anything when it asserts its power to
enjoin the nuisance-like activity.
Id. at 491 n.20 (citations omitted).
370. Id. at 491.
371. Id.
372. Id. at 491 n.21 (stating that "[t]he Takings Clause has never been read to require the
States or the courts to calculate whether a specific individual has suffered burdens under this
generic rule in excess of the benefits received." The Court explained, "not every individual gets a
full dollar return in benefits for the taxes he or she pays; yet, no one suggests that an individual
has a right to compensation for the difference between taxes paid and the dollar value of benefits
received").
Justice Stevens also referred to "average reciprocity of advantage" in his 1994 dissent in
Dolan, 512 U.S. at 408 (Stevens, J., dissenting), although there he seemed to use the phrase to
refer to offsetting benefits and burdens to a single property owner. He argued that in
determining whether the complaining property owner had indeed suffered a taking as a result of
the city's attachment of conditions to her application for a building permit to expand her
commercial structure, it was necessary to weigh the benefit she received from the building
permit against the burden inflicted upon her by the city's conditions. Id. at 408-09 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (citing Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415; Hodel, 481 U.S. at 715).
373. 438 U.S. at 138, 140-41 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He was joined in his dissent by
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stevens.
374. Id. at 139-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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asserted), but for the mutual benefit of the similarly situated property
owners.875 Here, the regulation did not create a historic district, which
might well result in reciprocal benefits to the subject property own-
ers,3 76 but rather singled out 400 buildings from a total of over one
million in New York City and imposed upon the owners not mere
restrictions upon land uses, but an affirmative duty to maintain and
preserve the designated structures.3 77 The benefit of such a regulation
flows equally to all residents of the city, but the burden falls dispro-
portionately upon those property owners whose properties have been
so designated.3 78 Thus, he concluded, if the property owners had been
engaged in a noxious use, such as those engaged in by the property
owners in Mugler, Hadacheck, Miller, and Goldblatt, no taking would
have occurred, regardless of the burden imposed upon the property
owners.379 Even where the regulation prevents a use that is not nox-
ious or nuisance-like, no taking arises if the regulation affects a broad
spectrum of property owners and affords an offsetting benefit to bur-
dened property owners (e.g., a zoning ordinance).380 Justice Rehnquist
noted: 'While zoning at times reduces individual property values, the
burden is shared relatively evenly and it is reasonable to conclude
that on the whole an individual who is harmed by one aspect of the
zoning will be benefited by another."s 1
Justice Rehnquist also dissented in Keystone ,32 where he re-
jected Justice Stevens's expansive notion of the average reciprocity of
advantage rule. He again noted that while police power actions that
result in reciprocity are valid under the Fifth Amendment, the
Takings Clause is designed to ensure that the state does not exceed
this inherent limitation and does not inflict upon a property owner a
375. Id. at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
376. Id. at 139 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist quoted from the opinion of
the New York Court of Appeals: "[In historic districting, as in traditional zoning,] owners
although burdened by the restrictions also benefit, to some extent, from the furtherance of a
general community plan." Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Penn Central, 47 N.Y.2d 324, 366
N.E.2d 1271, 1274 (1977)).
377. Id. at 140 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
378. Id. at 148-49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist stated:
Here. ... a multimillion dollar loss has been imposed on appellants; it is uniquely felt
and is not offset by any benefits flowing from the preservation of some 400 other
"landmarks" in New York City.... It is exactly this imposition of general costs on a few
individuals at which the "taking" protection is directed.
Id. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
379. Id. at 144-45 & n.8 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
380. Id. at 147 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
381. Id.
382. 480 U.S. at 506 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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burden that is greater than that borne by the public as a whole.3 83 A
regulation that disproportionately burdens specific property owners
cannot be justified on the grounds that it benefits society as a whole,
for virtually all regulations are designed to further the public weal.
Such a rule would, in effect, eradicate the protections of the Takings
Clause.384
The Supreme Court's next reference to the average reciprocity
of advantage rule occurred in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council. The reference was a fleeting one. Justice Scalia noted that
there are two instances in which the Court has found a regulation is a
taking regardless of the public interest asserted in support of the
police power action.3 85 The first is where the regulation results in a
physical invasion of the property;386 the second is where the regulation
"denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land."3 87
Although Justice Scalia noted that the rationale behind the second
category was unclear,38 in such an instance, where no economic use
survives the regulation, "it is less realistic to indulge [the] usual
assumption that the legislature is simply adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life in a manner that secures an 'average
reciprocity of advantage' .... 389 Rather, it is more likely in such a
situation that "private property is being pressed into some form of
public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm."39
Thus, Justice Scalia seemed to be mingling the average reciprocity of
advantage and harm/benefit tests, although the brevity of his
383. Id. at 512 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating that the Fifth Amendment "is designed
to prevent 'the public from loading upon one individual more than his just share of the burdens of
government, and says that when he surrenders to the public something more and different from
that which is exacted from other members of the public, a full and just equivalent shall be
returned to him'") (quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 325
(1893)).
384. See id. at 513 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("A broad exception to the operation of the
Just Compensation Clause based on the exercise of multifaceted health, welfare, and safety
regulations would surely allow government much greater authority than we have recognized to
impose societal burdens on individual landowners, for nearly every action the government takes
is intended to secure for the public an extra measure of 'health, safety, and welfare.'" (citation
omitted)).
385. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id. at 1017 (noting that the explanation may be that deprivation of all economic use is
the functional equivalent of a physical invasion from the property owner's point of view).
389. Id. at 1017-18 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124, and Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415).
390. Id. at 1018.
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reference makes it difficult to determine precisely the nature of his
analysis.
Dolan v. Tigard,391 decided by the Supreme Court in 1994,
implicitly raised the issue of average reciprocity of advantage. In that
case, the property owner applied for a building permit that would
allow her to expand her commercial business. The city attempted to
condition the granting of the permit upon the property owner's
dedicating to the city a portion of her property for flood control and a
bicycle path. Although the property owner conceded that the city
could, under certain circumstances, exact such a dedication in return
for a building permit, she argued that the exaction was inappropriate
in this instance. The city could point to "no special benefits" that the
permit conferred upon her, nor could it point to any "special quantifi-
able burdens" that her expansion would inflict upon the public.392 In
essence, the property owner was arguing the exactions could not be
justified by either the harm/benefit test (because the city could not
identify any harm caused by her activities) or by the average reciproc-
ity of advantage rule (because the city could not identify any benefits
that she received that would offset the burden imposed by the regula-
tory action). The Court resolved the case by formulating a nexus
standard that requires a "rough proportionality" between the burden
imposed upon the property owner and the state interest alleged to be
at stake.3 93 Because the required nexus was lacking on the facts before
the Court, the case was remanded so that the city could attempt to
make the proper showing that the dedication bore the correct relation-
ship to the stated purposes of the regulatory burden.394
In sum, modern Supreme Court application of the average
reciprocity of advantage rule shows no principled adherence to its
historical formulation. The rule has been permitted to evolve into a
"social reciprocity" equation that bears little resemblance to the bal-
ancing of individual benefit and burden envisioned by Justice Holmes
several decades ago.
C. Average Reciprocity of Advantage: A Summary
Certain underlying principles of the average reciprocity of
advantage rule can be divined from the Court's early opinions. First,
average reciprocity of advantage does not require a one-to-one equiva-
391. 512 U.S. at 374.
392. Id. at 386.
393. Id. at 391.
394. Id. at 395-96.
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lency between the burden imposed by the regulation and the resulting
benefit to the property owner-a rough approximation will suffice.
3 95
Second, some regulations will inevitably inflict pecuniary harm upon
the regulated individuals, even though no average reciprocity of ad-
vantage is identifiable. Although Justice Holmes spoke warily of the
"petty larceny of the police power,"s the Supreme Court has acknowl-
edged that the public must tolerate a certain degree of such economic
loss, lest government be unable to function.
397
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the
Takings Clause "was designed to bar Government from forcing some
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole. '8 98 The average reciprocity
of advantage rule, as originally envisioned and articulated by the
Court, provided a useful mechanism for determining which regula-
tions fall into the category of a burden to be borne by the public rather
than the individual property owner, i.e., for making the critical dis-
tinction between exercises of the eminent domain power and exercises
of the police power. For example, an ordinance requiring all develop-
ment within a jurisdiction to adhere to certain setback restrictions
may be based solely in aesthetics rather than in harm-preventing
considerations of public health, safety, or welfare. Nonetheless, the
ordinance will be a valid exercise of the police power because it con-
veys reciprocal benefits to all burdened property owners. 99 As Justice
Rehnquist explained in his dissent in Penn Central:
Typical zoning restrictions may... so limit the prospective uses of a piece of
property as to diminish the value of that property in the abstract because it
may not be used for the forbidden purposes. But any such abstract decrease in
395. See, for example, Keystone, 480 U.S. at 491 n.21 (noting that the Takings Clause does
not require courts and state legislatures to calculate whether a specific individual incurs burdens
in excess of benefits).
396. Howe, 1 Letters at 457 (cited in note 70).
397. See, for example, Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 518 (1944) (stating that a certain
degree of economic loss has never been a barrier to the use of the police power). The-Supreme
Court has explained such minimal loss by noting that the owner "is compensated for it by
sharing in the general benefits which the regulations are intended and calculated to secure."
L'Hote v. New Orleans, 177 U.S. 587, 599 (1900) (quoting Dillon, 1 Municipal Corporations § 141
(cited in note 256)).
398. The quote originally appeared in Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960),
and has been repeated by the Court on numerous occasions since. See, for example, Dolan, 512
U.S. at 384; Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for
Southern Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 647 (1993); Pennell, 485 U.S. at 9, 19; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835-36
n.4.
399. Oswald, 70 Wash. L. Rev. at 141-42 (cited in note 3).
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value will more than likely be at least partially offset by an increase in value
which flows from similar restrictions as to use on neighboring properties. All
property owners in a designated area are placed under the same restrictions,
not only for the benefit of the municipality as a whole but also for the common
benefit of one another.
4°°
The problem with the modern formulation of the average reciprocity of
advantage rule, as espoused by Justice Brennan in Penn Central and
as adopted by later Courts, is that it ignores both the need for reci-
procity and the need to balance the burdens imposed on the individual
landowner against the benefits received by that same landowner from
the regulation at issue.
In stating that a regulation could be justified as a valid police
power act provided that the benefits to society outweighed the burdens
on the regulated property owner, Justice Brennan essentially wiped
out the average reciprocity of advantage rule's ability to distinguish
between valid police power actions and invalid regulatory takings.
The effect of Justice Brennan's formulation of the rule is to validate
automatically any alleged police power action which confers a
substantial benefit upon society at large.41 Thus, the modern
formulation of the rule permits the state to achieve through a back-
door exercise of the police power what it could not accomplish directly;
in other words, it permits the state to confiscate an individual's
property interest without compensation in order to confer a public
benefit.40
2
400. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 139-40 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
401. This precise result has been urged by at least one commentator, who stated:
Reciprocity demands should be deemed to be met, and the regulation therefore deemed to
be a legitimate exercise of the police power, in any case where the land use restrictions
affirmatively enhance the community's welfare. Therefore, rather than requiring that
direct individualized benefits accrue to the burdened individual, reciprocity defenses
would focus on the benefits gained by the community at large. Individuals' use of
property could legally be restricted even where their properties received no reciprocal, or
offsetting, enhanced value; insofar as the individual landowners, in their role as
members of society, could be characterized as sharing in the restriction's benefit, they
would be denied legal redress. In short, the concept of "average reciprocity of advantage"
could be utilized to provide broad justification for land use regulation and thereby
substantially limit the accessibility of inverse condemnation actions.
Coletta, 40 Am. U. L. Rev. at 303 (cited in note 218).
402. Lower courts have applied this broad, societal-benefit interpretation of average reci-
procity of advantage. In Moskow v. Commissioner of Dept. of Env. Management, 427 N.E.2d 750
(Mass. 1981), for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Court rejected a takings claim stemming
from a wetlands regulation, finding that "[a]s a citizen, the plaintiff benefits from the [wetlands
regulation] because it helps society avoid the relief expenditures connected with flooding and




Although a full discussion of police power analysis is beyond
the scope of this Article, the issue is central to resolution of the
takings dilemma. The harmlbenefit test and the average reciprocity of
advantage rule are essential tools in effectuating the two-step analyti-
cal scheme I have proposed: first, identification of the government
power at work, and second, evaluation of the validity of the govern-
ment's exercise of that power.
In their original formulations, the harm/benefit test and the
average reciprocity of advantage rule were used to distinguish be-
tween exercises of the police power and exercises of the eminent
domain power. As discussed earlier,40 3 while all exercises of the emi-
nent domain power by definition confer benefits upon the public,
exercises of the police power may either prevent a harm or confer a
benefit. To the extent that a regulation prevents a harm to the public,
it is a noncompensable exercise of the police power. If a regulation
confers a benefit upon the public, however, further analysis is re-
quired to determine whether the regulation is a taking for which
compensation is constitutionally mandated or an exercise of the police
power for which no compensation is required.
Certainly, the harm/benefit and average reciprocity of advan-
tage rules will not resolve all takings challenges that arise. The
search for such a definitive rule is likely not only to be fruitless, but to
entangle the searcher in increasingly narrow, formalistic expositions
of takings law that bear increasingly less resemblance to reality.
Recent legal scholarship has recognized that grand unifying theories
may simply not exist in many areas of constitutional law.40 4 As
Professor Schauer noted:
Perhaps some constitutional problems are irredeemably intractable, and are so
precisely because they replicate the deepest, hardest, and therefore least
solvable problems of constitutional government. And perhaps some
constitutional problems appear intractable because we are looking for coherent
principles and usable doctrines in areas of policy where questions of degree
predominate, and where seemingly arbitrary lines are necessary to settle
403. See text accompanying note 27.
404. See, for example, Laurence H. Tribe and Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution
24-30 (Harvard U., 1991) (arguing that the search for unifying principles in constitutional law is
an attempt at "hyper-integration" that ultimately must fail); Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism
and the Constitution, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 1331, 1334 (1988) (describing the trend away from grand
theories in constitutional law).
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temporarily, but not to resolve in any deeper sense, intrinsically competing
policy objectives.
40 5
A few takings challenges undoubtedly fall into this category of difficult
or indeed, virtually intractable, cases. By seeking the answer to regu-
latory takings, we miss that there is an answer which goes a long way
toward resolving most disputes. We should not let the difficulty of
choosing between red cedars and apple trees blind us to the fact that
most takings challenges can be decided easily and quickly under the
basic rules developed by the Court decades ago.
The American legal system (and American society itself) is at a
transition point in how it views property and harms to property. The
cases that arise before the Court are the difficult ones, ones not sus-
ceptible to easy solutions. The mere fact that such difficult cases arise
does not mean that the basic rules are not working, however. As
Professor Epstein has noted, whenever we create a legal rule, "some
uncertainty must be tolerated at the edges; sound social institutions
will never stand or fall on the marginal classification issues that test
every legal doctrine."40 6 A clear definition of the police and eminent
domain powers and a careful application of the harm/benefit and
average reciprocity of advantage rules will minimize the number of
cases at the edges.
405. Frederick Schauer, Too Hard: Unconstitutional Conditions and the Chimera of
Constitutional Consistency, 72 Deny. U. L. Rev. 989, 990 (1995).
406. Epstein, Takings at 114 (cited in note 152). See also id. at 118 ("So long as we are sure
that the vast bulk of the cases falls clearly on one side of the line or the other, we can easily
tolerate some ambiguity at the margins: litigation exerts powerful forces to select the most
difficult cases for adjudication, no matter what the underlying standard").
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